|
China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
February 25, 2004
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
According to the 2000 census, the total population of
the country's 55 ethnic minorities was 106.4 million,
or 8.4 percent of the total population. Most minority
groups resided in areas they traditionally have
inhabited. The Government's avowed policy on
minorities calls for preferential treatment in
marriage regulations, birth planning, university
admission, and employment. Programs have been
established to provide low-interest loans, subsidies,
and special development funds for minority areas.
Nonetheless, in practice, minorities faced
discrimination by the majority Han culture. Most of
the minorities in border regions were less educated
than the national average, and job discrimination in
favor of Han migrants remained a serious problem.
Racial discrimination was the source of deep
resentment on the part of minorities in some areas,
such as Xinjiang and Tibetan areas. For example,
ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang did not have equal access
to newly created construction jobs associated with
development projects; Han workers were brought in from
Sichuan and elsewhere to work, particularly on
technical projects such as oil and gas pipelines. The
Government did not openly recognize racism against
minorities or tension among different ethnic groups as
problems.
Government development policies have long been in
place to improve minority living standards. However,
while overall standards of living for those in
minority areas have improved as a result of these
policies, real incomes in minority areas, particularly
for minorities, remained well below those in other
parts of the country. The majority Han Chinese have
benefited disproportionately from government programs
and economic growth, even in minority areas. Many
development programs have disrupted traditional living
patterns of minority groups, and have included, in
some cases, the forced evacuation of persons (see
Section 2.d.).
Since 1949, Government policy has resulted in a
significant migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang.
According to a Government White Paper released in May,
approximately 8.25 million of Xinjiang's 19.25 million
official residents were Han Chinese, up from 300,000
Han in 1949. Approximately 8 million Xinjiang
residents are Uighurs. Signficant numbers of Kazakhs,
Hui, Tajiks, and other minorities also live in
Xinjiang. Official statistics underestimated the Han
population of Xinjiang because the Government did not
count the thousands of Han Chinese who were long-term
"temporary workers" as part of the official population.
The migration of ethnic Han into Xinjiang in recent
decades has caused the Han-Uighur ratio in the capital
of Urumqi to shift from 20:80 to 80:20 and was a
source of Uighur resentment. Similarly, many
non-Tibetan residents of the TAR have lived there for
years as "temporary" residents (see Tibet Addendum).
In many areas with a significant population of
minorities, there were two-track school systems which
used either standard Chinese or the local minority
language. Students could choose to attend schools in
either system. However, graduates of minority language
schools typically needed 1 year or more of intensive
Chinese before they could handle course work at a
Chinese-language university. Despite the Government's
efforts to provide schooling in minority languages,
the dominant position of standard Chinese in
government, commerce, and academia put graduates of
minority schools who lacked standard Chinese
proficiency at a disadvantage. The vast majority of
Uighur children in Xinjiang attended Uighur-language
schools and generally received an hour's Chinese
language instruction per day. Tuition at
Chinese-language schools in Xinjiang was generally
more costly, and thus, most Uighur children living in
rural areas were unable to afford them.
The CCP has an avowed policy of boosting minority
representation in the Government and the CCP, and
minorities constituted 14 percent of the NPC, which
was higher than their percentage in the population. A
1999 government white paper reported that there were
2.7 million minority officials in the Government. The
May Government White Paper states that there are
348,000 minority cadres in Xinjiang, accounting for
51.8 percent of all Party members in the autonomous
region. Many members of minorities occupied local
leadership positions, and a few held positions of
influence in the local Party apparatus or at the
national level. For example, 63 percent of Xinjiang's
deputies to the NPC are ethnic minorities. However, in
most areas, ethnic minorities were shut out of
positions of real political and economic power, which
fed resentment of Han officials holding the most
powerful Party positions in minority autonomous
regions.
Tensions between ethnic Han citizens and Uighurs in
Xinjiang continued, and the authorities continued to
restrict political, civil, and religious freedoms (see
Section 2.c.) in the region. A campaign that began in
1997 to stress unity and to condemn "splittism" and
religious extremism showed no signs of abating. During
the year, authorities continued to prohibit activities
deemed separatist in nature, announced tightened
security measures, and mounted campaigns to crack down
on opposition.
The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang specifically
targeted the "three evils" of extremism, splittism,
and terrorism as the major threats to Xinjiang's
social stability. Because the Government authorities
in Xinjiang regularly grouped together those involved
in "ethnic separatism, illegal religious activities,
and violent terrorism," it was often unclear whether
particular raids, detentions, or judicial punishments
targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those
engaged in violence. Many observers raised concerns
that the Government's war on terror was a
justification for cracking down harshly on Uighurs
expressing peaceful political dissent and on
independent Muslim religious leaders. On December 15,
the Government published an "East Turkestan Terrorist
List," which labelled organizations such as the World
Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkestan
Information Center as terrorist entities. These groups
openly advocate for East Turkestan independence, but
have not been publicly linked to violent activity.
Uighurs were executed and sentenced to long prison
terms during the year on charges of separatism.
According to official accounts, by May 2001, the
authorities had prosecuted more than 3,000 cases and
massive public sentencing rallies attended by more
than 300,000 persons had been held throughout the
region. In October, Uighur Shaheer Ali was executed
after being convicted of terrorism in 2002 and
sentenced to death in March. In 2002, Ali and another
Uighur were repatriated forcibly to the country from
Nepal, where they had been granted refugee status by
the UNHCR.
For many Uighurs, the ongoing imprisonment of Uighur
businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer symbolized the
Government's mistreatment of Uighurs. In March 2000, a
Xinjiang court sentenced Kadeer, a former member of
the provincial-level Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference, to 8 years in prison on
charges of "passing state intelligence" to foreigners;
according to an official press report, the
intelligence she was accused of passing included
newspaper articles and a list of names of persons
whose cases had been handled by the courts. Kadeer,
her son, and her secretary were arrested in 1999 while
on their way to meet a visiting foreign delegation.
Kadeer reportedly suffered various health problems in
prison. Some foreign observers believed Kadeer was
singled out for her activism on behalf of Uighurs and
for her husband's involvement with Uighur causes and
Radio Free Asia. In December 2002, some of Kadeer's
family members were briefly detained and questioned
during a visit of senior foreign officials.
Other Uighurs whose work emphasized pride in cultural
identity have also been harassed and detained by the
Government. In late 2001, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee ruled that Uighur scholar Tohti Tunyaz had
been arbitrarily detained. He was sentenced in 1999 to
an 11-year term for "inciting separatism" and "illegally
acquiring state secrets" after he returned to Xinjiang
in connection with his research studies on ethnic
minorities at the University of Tokyo.
Possession of separatist publications or audiovisual
materials was not permitted, and, according to reports,
possession of such materials resulted in lengthy
prison sentences. The author of a history of the
Uighurs that was severely criticized by
provincial-level and national authorities in the
mid-1990s remained prohibited from publishing or from
meeting with foreigners. A Uighur-language press
existed in Xinjiang, but it had a very small
circulation. During the year, regulations requiring
Uighurs to use Mandarin Chinese characters for their
names on identification documents were reportedly
strengthened.
Han control of the region's political and economic
institutions also contributed to heightened tension.
Although government policies brought tangible economic
improvements to Xinjiang, Han residents have received
a disproportionate share of the benefits. The majority
of Uighurs were poor farmers, and 25 percent were
illiterate.
|
