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TURKISTAN: CONSOLIDATING FACTORS
FOR ITS PEOPLE
Turkistan
By Odil Ruzaliev, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I would like to discuss some of the main
barriers, disagreements and conflicts among the
Turkistani countries hindering integration processes
in the region. I will offer some reconciliatory
mechanisms that could improve the regional cooperation
and promote the economic and perhaps even political
integration in the region. I will mention
consolidating factors of the past and their
irrelevance today, speculate about the possibility of
the region's unification into a single Turkistani
state conglomerate differentiating the approaches
taken by the Soviet Union and the European Union in
this regard. At the end I will give recommendations on
state, non-state and international levels that could
potentially contribute to the integration processes in
Central Turkistan.The purpose of this paper is to
revive (remind) most of the commonalities among the
Turkistani people, their identity and the need for
more unity and integration through a call to widely
use the forgotten terms of «Turkistan» to name the
current region and «Turkic people» to name its Muslim
inhabitants. Although the region is now called Central
Asia, the paper suggests that it may keep this
geographic name only for the outside world, but should
be referred to as «Turkistan» for its peoples to help
them create a single, Turkic identity, which
eventually should eliminate tensions between the
countries and peoples of the region. One may argue
that this move is reminiscent of the Soviet identity
that was imposed during the USSR contributing to the
political, social, and cultural repression of certain
ethnic groups, which altered the life-style, history,
and cultures of these groups. However, it should be
noted that unlike the peoples of Turkistan, a few
countries of the Soviet Union had such a common ethnic
identity, religion, and language. The Soviet identity,
thus, was artificial and imposed. The Soviet identity
was used more for the outside world and not within the
Soviet Union, where groups still retained their names.
For Ukrainians or Moldovans, Uzbeks were Uzbeks and
Kazakhs were Kazakhs, and not Soviets. For Americans
and others, they were simply Soviets or worse -
Russians. The notion of Turks of Central Asia or
Turkistanians should be used for the peoples of the
region themselves to promote unity and closeness while
retaining their main ethnic identities. However this
paper should not be viewed as promoting the revival of
Pan-Turkism. This work does not attempt to reanimate
or to promote such an expansionist idea that today can
only be achieved at the expense of others. One should
clearly understand that the time of empires is gone
and the only remaining superpower today is struggling
very much to preserve its imperial status in the world.
The paper does not aim to make recommendations to
pursue this issue at official government levels either.
Such a move would be considered a threat by some
regional nations like Russia, China, and Iran and
could provoke them to take covert actions to undermine
the situation in the region or may lead to the
deterioration of economic and other relations between
these nations and the states of Central Turkistan.
BRIEF HISTORIC PREVIEW
With the Soviets in power in Central Asia in early
1920s, the Jadidist movement sought to define the
identity of the peoples of Central Asia and the
region's position in the new empire. After defeating
all three feudal administrative establishments of the
Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva, the Bolsheviks brought the
Central Asians under a single administrative entity
Turkistan - in an attempt to facilitate and centralize
control. This was a chance for the Jadidist movement
to defend the rights of the region's Muslims under a
single authority within the Soviet Union through
education, enlightenment, and a larger political
representation within the Soviet Union. The fear of
Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism forced the Soviet regime
to apply the Czarist Russia's policy of divide and
rule.
This division of the nations of Turkistan into five
republics proved problematic: borders were not drawn
according to ethnic and geographic lines, and new
Soviet symbols such as flags, anthems, new geographic
names, and separate history books put the rift between
the people with a common history, language, and
religion. The gradual inhabitation of Russians in
those republics added to those differences: the
Russians of Central Asia appointed by Moscow to higher
posts played the Muslims of the region against each
other. Stalin's repressions in late 1930s beheaded the
Jadidist movement and put an end to the unificationist
aspirations in the region once and for all.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there appeared
an opportune moment to restore the common identity and
statehood of the Turkistan nations under Islam's
political leadership. By that time already, the Soviet
reign had damaged the historic and cultural links
between these peoples. Islam and people's wavering
religious commitment due to a long period of the
atheist doctrine could not play fully its role.
Inspired by the Turkey's endeavors to lead the union
of the newly-formed Turkic states, some of them
promptly introduced the Turkish model of economic
development and converted their Cyrillic alphabets
into Latin script. However it did not take them too
long to realize the extent of the problems inherited
from the Soviet times: their [problems] utter
incompatibility with any remedy Turkey could offer and
inability to dispatch them through any known
conventional means of Soviet policy-making.
There are two primary sources to such a stalemate:
firstly, the current leaders of Central Asia are the
acolytes of the Soviet system, and after twelve years
of their countries' independence, they still approach
the puzzles of state governance with skills and means
inherited from the Soviets. Inadvertent founding
fathers, as they are, the leaders of modern nations of
Turkistan did not have to lead the fight for their
independence. Independence was upon them leaving them
with no choice but to accept it, becoming the victims
of the Slavic conspiracy. They were neither democrats,
nor dictators, nor nationalist heroes, even though
they may have been opportunists. They had never made
independent decisions in Soviet times and well aware
of the highly- vulnerable nature of their nations'
premature births, and fully recognized the risk of
their own ouster.
Secondly, since their independence these leaders have
been too preoccupied with orientation of their states'
foreign policy looking for a powerful ally among the
larger states. They remained completely oblivious to
the idea that together, in unity, they could make up a
power stronger than an alliance with any other state.
They sought a rich country that could solve their
problems instead of looking towards each other and
working together to solve those problems. They looked
for a stronger power fearing the reanimation of
Russia's imperial ambitions or other power's influence
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have become engaged in a regional
competition riddled with political ambition and
individual agenda of the leaders: a competition
focusing more on politics than economics virtually
harming more than benefiting both states. Finally,
territorial disputes represent another factor making
the division and subsequent unification especially
difficult Central Turkistan's leaders were also aware
that, although each republic was named for a local
nationality, none was a "national homeland." The
Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tajiks all have border claims for
parts of neighboring territories backed by large
irredentist populations on which to base them.
Stalin's map-making skills were sufficient to ensure
that no Soviet republic would have an easy transition
to nation-statehood.
Today's Turkistani nations' frontiers are protected by
land mines, shackled with border closures, new
check-points and border posts, rended by minor border
skirmishes involving casualties, and, most importantly,
governed through trade restrictions and inability or
reluctance to carry out mutually signed treaties. The
Central Turkistanian states have repeatedly tried to
solve their problems and agree on differences in
foreign policy through constant transformation of
organizations like the Central Asian Inter-State
Council, the Central Asian Union, the Central Asian
Economic Community, and the Organization of the
Central Asian Cooperation as well as summits of the
CIS, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the summit of
the Turkic-speaking state-leaders. However none of
these organizations met the expectations of these
summits and participation in these organizations. The
documents and treaties signed grow parched covered by
dust in the archives.
Bilateral Problems
Each country in Central Turkistan experiences problems
in dealing with at least one of its regional neighbors.
Uzbekistan especially has problems with every country
of the region. Turkmenistan's president blamed
Uzbekistan for harboring the alleged master-minds of
the plot against Saparmurat Niyazov and both countries
view each other as strong rivals in a gas pipeline
project extending via Afghanistan to Pakistan. The
number of border posts on both sides has increased and
military exercises and maneuvers in border areas have
become more frequent. The water and gas issue is the
prevailing problem in Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Over the
past few years, Kyrgyzstan, as an upper stream country,
repeatedly has released more water from its Toktogul
reservoir than was agreed to generate electricity,
flooding Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the winter and
risking a shortage of water for irrigation in the
summer. Uzbekistan has cut off electricity and gas
supplies to its upstream neighbors several times.
When the government of Uzbekistan raised import dues
on shuttle-traders, Uzbekistan's major markets lost
their customers. The flow of goods into the country
stopped and the population could not afford to buy
things at expensive supermarkets further enriching
some government officials who own or control
businesses - one of the reasons why the government had
made such a move at the first place. As a result,
people flooded the Uzbek-Kazakh border trying to buy
goods in the neighboring republic which caused a
multi-million dollar ebb into Kazakhstan. In response
the Uzbek officials sealed the Uzbek-Kazakh border «to
stop poor-quality imports from China». Many
small-scale importers and exporters have gone
underground and others have been squeezed out of
business. In markets around the country prices have
risen and fewer goods and less choice are causing
growing discontent.
The same situation was observed at the Uzbek-Kyrgyz
border. In Kara Su, a Kyrgyz market town on the border
with Uzbekistan, the small bridge that used to connect
both countries stops in mid-air half-way across. Last
January, Uzbekistan's authorities decided to close the
border and simply dismantled their side of the bridge.
The idea was to stem the spread of imaginary diseases
from Kyrgyzstan while keeping subsidized petrol and
fertilizers inside Uzbekistan. Another reason was to
keep out cheap Chinese imports, from flip-flops to
cooking pots, the sorts of things that are freely
available in the Kara Su bazaar. The problem did not
vanish with the destruction of the bridge. People
turned out to be more creative than the government:
they began crossing the river on boats. The creativity
appeared to be tragic for some of them. So far around
100 people have drowned in an attempt to cross the
river in self-made boats and bridges. They could have,
of course, gotten to Kara Su legally, through the
border posts. But that would result in an extra few
miles and in the loss of some nerves or money to be
used to bribe the border guards.
Uzbek-Tajik ethnic issues stem from large numbers of
Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan respectively and Uzbek President Islam
Karimov's opposition to Emomali Rakhmonov's rule and
the support for his rivals like Colonel Mahmud
Khudoyberdiev, who allegedly found sanctuary in
Uzbekistan.
The economic costs affect not only the border areas,
but also the whole region's economy and development.
Trade barriers and border closures have been
particularly onerous for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
whose exports have to travel through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to reach Russia and Europe. Corruption and
extortion at border posts and along the roads only
aggravate the problem.
Integration problems
What made integration unattainable during all these
years? Why couldn't peoples with a common history,
language, and culture find common ground to fulfill
their ancestors' dream of a single state or at least a
unified region? To answer these questions, I would
like to point the reader's attention to the following
reasons:
1) Once independence became a reality for these
countries, the leaders of Central Turkistan became
preoccupied with solving the immediate economic
problems in their countries. The denial to the ruble
zone by Russia propelled the states of Central
Turkistan to introduce their own currencies. The
breakdown of raw supplies forced them to restore the
fractured economic infrastructure in their countries
by building necessary industries. This in turn
compelled them to look towards more developed
countries for investments and assistance. The
communication went outbound rather than inbound
regionally. Russia cut the ties linking it to Central
Asia that it had once set.
2) Regional economic trade declined and regional
business projects were absent due to deteriorating
infrastructure and vanishing bridging ties between the
newly-formed republics. The peoples of the region were
more exposed to the culture of foreign businesses
operating in Central Asia and knew more about those
countries who became new allies than their own
neighbors. Kazakhstan remained more pro-Russian,
Kyrgyzstan looked towards the West, Uzbekistan
constantly changed model-powers among Turkey, South
Korea, China, Russia and the United States;
Turkmenistan insisted on neutrality. However, none of
the Turkistan states was pro-each other. They existed
in the same neighborhood, but did not notice or
constructively acknowledge each other. The only
institution that more or less united and coordinated
the life-styles of the Muslims of Central Asia, the
Central Asian Spiritual Board of Muslims (SADUM),
dissolved itself following the creations of separate
boards of Muslims in each republic headed by a
separate Mufti. Thus, even the religious ties in the
region were falling apart.
3) Once foreign investments bore some fruit and
Central Turkistan had some economic growth, the
mistaken opinion prevailed that the regional states
could do without partnership with their neighbors.
Having most of the essential resources at their
disposal: Uzbekistan with cotton and gold; Tajikistan
with aluminum, Kazakhstan with oil and Turkmenistan
with gas, these countries naively relied on their own
capacity to prospect the resources in their sole
possession and without Russian interference or counsel
anymore. The delusion was also partly due to regional
competition or rather the ambition of some of its
leaders who wanted to be a model of success for their
neighbors as soon as possible. Claims of Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan for regional leadership moved the
countries of the region, which had just got rid of one
such leader in the face of Russia, away from each
other and created mistrust among them. This was also
one of the main reasons
why the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia
resented Turkey's role of an older brother. The
principles of equality that these countries had been
demanding from Russia in its relations with the
Central Asian states were violated by both Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan.
4) The rise of militant Islam in the region further
deteriorated the inter-regional relations, especially
between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with
the latter often criticizing the former two for their
weakness in dealing with radical Islamic insurgents
leading to mining by Uzbekistan of its borders in
mountainous areas, which caused human casualties. The
border with Tajikistan connecting Tashkent to the
Ferghana Valley via Khojent had been closed for a long
time since the civil war broke out in Tajikistan.
Mutual introductions of visa regimes in the region
between some of the states contributed to further
alienation. The Uzbek government's erroneous policy of
levying a heavy taxation from domestic shuttle traders
made the population travel to neighboring Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan for cheaper and deficit goods leaving
millions of dollars a day outside the country. This
led to more border closures.
However, for the sake of fair judgment, it is
important to acknowledge that the regional leaders
also made some attempts for closer cooperation and
integration, especially at earlier stages. The role of
Turkey and regional organizations in this process has
already been mentioned. The reason was simple: the
leaders did not have enough political experience to
run a country independently, nor the necessary
expertise in foreign politics. The former Soviet
territory and Central Asia were the areas Central
Asian leaders knew better. Besides knowing each other
personally, they still had strong economic,
territorial, and cultural links to each other. The
collapse of the USSR has opened Central Turkistan to
the influence of the outside world with subsequent
prospects for mutual benefits. The newly-formed states
have at first found themselves at a loss trying to
pick the right ally. It was during this time, that
they created some regional organizations and were very
active in attending summits of Turkic-speaking state
leaders led by Turkey. At that time Turkey seemed to
be a beacon, whose light began to dim very soon by
mid-1990s. Turkey's relations with Uzbekistan, the key
Turkic state in the region, deteriorated when the
secular regime in Turkey could not influence the
country's strong religious groups led by Necmittin
Erbakan, who was Turkey's prime minister between 1996
and 1997, to break off with anti-Karimov groups based
in Turkey allegedly responsible for terrorist attacks
in Tashkent in February 1996. The Uzbek government
closed all Turkish schools and madrasas (religious
schools) in Uzbekistan and ordered all Uzbek students
studying at Turkish universities to return home,
ostensibly to protect them from Turkish Muslim
extremist influences . It became harder and harder for
Turkish citizens to get an Uzbek visa. This led to the
introduction of a reciprocal visa regime by Turkey,
which started in June, 2003. Uzbekistan became the
only Central Asian state to receive such treatment.
Overall Turkey lacked sufficient resources and the
political will, even though it claimed leadership in
this integrationist process. After decades of waiting
for an invitation to the EU in the hope of improving
its economic situation, Turkey was not in a position
to offer sufficient economic incentives. Turkey also
did not consider the national sentiment of Central
Asian states who, unlike the East Turkistanis
resisting their Chinese oppressors, did not wage a
constant underground struggle for independence from
the Soviets in the hopes of achieving liberation and
unity with their brothers from Turkey. On the contrary,
Turkistan was integrated into the single Soviet
system. The same can be said about the 20 million
Turks of Russia - Tartars, Bashkirs, Chechens,
Dagestanis, and others.
The difference between the Soviet Turks and the Turks
from China is that the post-World War II Soviet party
leadership did not have an explicit discriminatory
domestic policy specifically targeting any of the
fifteen titular nations. China, unlike the Soviet
Union, does not pursue the policy of «friendship among
peoples». Bearing in mind that language is one of the
most important aspects of integration, Turkey did not
have enough resources to invest in the educational
system of the Turkic states. In fact, the literacy
rate in the Central Asian states was much higher than
that of Turkey. During the first "Turkic summit", held
in November 1992 in Ankara, Turkey employed Russians
to interpret between the Central Asian and Azeri
participants, who spoke Russian to each other unlike
the representatives of Turkey. Turkey had also the
disadvantage of being territorially separate from the
region, creating a transportation problem. Turkey also
could not openly challenge Russia's geo-strategic
interests in the region. Doing so might have
jeopardized economic relations with Russia, which is
one of Turkey's top-five export-import partners.
Turkey's vulnerability to Russia became evident during
the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-1994, during which Turkey
avoided explicit involvement by not providing military
support to the Azerbaijanis.
And finally, Turkey's new role of «big brother» to the
Central Asian Turks, who had just got rid of another
big brother, was met with resistance. Apparently,
Turkey had learned little from the history of the
Soviet Union. So, overtime the popular slogan «Turkistan
- Our Common Home», which referred to Turkey, fell
into disuse in Uzbekistan. The Latinisation of the
Uzbek alphabet, which had been initiated by the late
Turkish president Turgut Ozal, came to a halt.
One thing is crucial for Turkey to understand today:
the Turks of Central Asia share many commonalities
with Russians and some other non-Turkic nationalities
of the former Soviet Union due to historic events.
However, the situation is changing with the
diminishing status of the Russian language in the
educational systems of the region's states due to the
growing popularity of the English language.
To be continued
Note: Odil Ruzaliev is a graduate student at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University in Medford, MA, USA
Baku Today, 19/11/2003 23:27
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