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Ominous Indian Shift on Tibet
B Raman
June 30, 2003
In its anxiety to further improve relations with China
and to wean Beijing away from Islamabad, has the
government of India taken the first step towards
writing off the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans and
abandoning any role by India in helping to preserve
the unique Tibetan culture and Tibetan school of
Buddhism?
This question first arose in the minds of
Tibet-watchers after the recent incident in which,
perhaps for the first time, the government of Nepal
complied with a Chinese demand to detain and hand over
19 Tibetan refugees fleeing perceived persecution in
their traditional homeland, which is recognized by
India and the rest of the world as a part of China.
Many, including this writer, suspected that Kathmandu
might not have taken a serious and troubling step like
this without a nod from New Delhi.
The US reportedly expressed its concern and
unhappiness over this action of the Nepal government.
Despite this, there are reports that similar action
against another group of refugees is under way.
This question becomes even more troubling after the
six-day high-profile visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
the Indian Prime Minister, to China from June 22. The
visit, which took place a year before parliamentary
elections in India, was marked by much hype,
apparently with an eye on the polls. "Historic", "path-breaking",
" a new beginning" "never before have such productive
discussions been held" were some of the expressions
used by the spinmasters of the government and
dutifully played up by the embedded journalists who
had accompanied the premier.
To find more objective and critical accounts, one has
to search for the reports of journalists who were not
accorded this privilege and honor and hence traveled
independently, or those who stayed behind in India and
viewed the visit from there. The fact that some of
this kind felt troubled by the way their fraternity
went overboard in helping the government to project
the visit as "something like this has never happened
before" would be evident from the comments of Inder
Malhotra, a highly respected senior journalist, who
has covered Sino-Indian relations right from the first
decade of India's independence, starting in 1947.
He wrote in The Hindu, a prestigious national
newspaper, on June 26, "As has happened all too often
in the past and is most certain to be repeated in the
future, the media contingent accompanying him went
into a tizzy of exaggeration and hyperbole."
Shorn of the hype, the outcome of the visit is partly
disconcerting, partly questionable and partly
gratifying. The disconcerting aspect relates to Sikkim
and Tibet. Until the middle of the 1970s, Sikkim used
to be a protectorate of India, which had overall
responsibility for its defense and foreign relations.
Barring this, the territory enjoyed some autonomy
under a ruler called the Chogyal. He got married to an
American student called Hope Cook, who had come to
Sikkim ostensibly for research. The Indian
intelligence and Indira Gandhi, the then prime
minister, viewed her as a mole of the US's Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), allegedly planted on him to
steer him in the direction of independence for his
territory.
One could never prove whether or not she was a CIA
mole, but it was a fact that he came under her
fascinating spell and started moving in the direction
of independence. He and his wife, for reasons
unconnected with India, became unpopular and a
movement against them resulted in their overthrow and
the territory becoming a state of India, like any
other state, thereby ending its special status.
Chinese intelligence, too, was as much concerned as
its Indian counterpart over her presence and
activities from Sikkim, which is on China's border.
Despite this, Beijing strongly condemned what it
described as the Indian annexation of Sikkim. It
viewed it as one more instance of Indian "hegemonism"
in action.
China had never claimed Sikkim as its territory and
never disputed its pre-1975 status as an Indian
protectorate. Thus, Sikkim is a non-issue in the long
pending border dispute between the two countries.
Beijing's apparent objection was to India's ending its
special status and making it an integral part of India.
Until - even after Vajpayee's visit - it has not
recognized it as an integral part of India, but
Vajpayee has claimed that the first steps towards such
Chinese recognition have been taken with an agreement
called a memorandum concluded during the visit for the
resumption of border trade through Sikkim.
The first step towards the resumption of trans-border
trade was taken by the two countries through a
memorandum signed in December 1991, which designated
certain points for the trade and through a protocol
for regulating it signed in July 1992. The points
identified under that memorandum for border trade did
not include the Sikkim sector.
It is said that in 1997 China took the initiative in
suggesting the resumption of traditional trade through
Sikkim too. The matter was under negotiation between
the two countries since then. There are two possible
routes for the border trade through Sikkim - via the
Nathu La pass and via Jalep La in southeastern Sikkim.
Before the Sino-Indian war of 1962, most of the border
trade took place through Jalep La. From Jalep La, the
Chinese/Tibetan traders used to enter Kalimpong in
West Bengal, where China had been allowed by the
Jawaharlal Nehru government to set up a trade post,
which was supervised by a Chinese consulate in Kolkata
(Calcutta).
Following the deterioration of relations between the
two countries, which led to the war of 1962, the
government of India ordered the Chinese trade post at
Kalimpong and the consulate at Kolkata to close down.
The Indian intelligence suspected them of indulging in
espionage and subversion. Till today, no government in
New Delhi has agreed to their being re-opened, despite
the improvement of bilateral relations, reportedly
because of continued misgivings over the wisdom of
such action.
It is said that the original Chinese proposal was for
the resumption of the border trade through the
pre-1962 Jalep La/Kalimpong route or through both the
Nathu La and Jalep La routes. Apparently, the
government of India agreed only to the Nathu La route,
which would not require the re-opening of the Chinese
trade post at Kalimpong.
In the buildup that preceded the visit of the prime
minister to China, this impending memorandum on the
resumption of border trade through Sikkim was
projected as a major breakthrough of great political
significance since it amounted to a Chinese
recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India. In
my earlier article titled Understanding China: The
view from India, written before the prime minister's
visit, I expressed my doubts about the validity of
this projection.
Even as Vajpayee was in Beijing, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman punctured the Indian euphoria by
clarifying that it was nothing of the sort. He
described the Sikkim question as an "enduring legacy"
of the past and said that "it cannot be solved
overnight". Despite this, New Delhi has maintained
that the memorandum amounted to a de facto recognition
of the Indian position by China, even though it might
not amount to a de jure recognition. In support of
this, it has been pointed out that the preamble of the
memorandum talks of the two countries being "desirous
of opening another pass on the India-China border" for
border trade. If Sikkim's border with Tibet
constitutes India's border with China, the inference
is that Sikkim is a integral part of India. So the
argument goes, definitely with some validity.
China's renewed interest in a presence in Sikkim,
which resumed trade would involve, and, ultimately in
Kalimpong, has economic as well as political motives.
The economic motive is obvious and needs no
explanation. The political motive arises from the fact
that in addition to the route through Nepal, Tibetan
political refugees fleeing perceived persecution have
preferred the Jalep La-Kalimpong route. The more
sensitive refugees, who had held offices of authority
in Tibet, had avoided the Nepalese route, as they were
not sure even in the past of how the Nepalese
authorities would handle them. When the Dalai Lama and
his entourage fled Tibet in the 1950s, they used the
route through Kalimpong.
The Chinese administration in Lhasa had always been
anxious to plug these routes of escape for the
political refugees. With the Nepalese route now
apparently ruled out, the only safe route which
remains for them is through Sikkim. By signing this
memorandum, has the government of India consciously or
unconsciously helped the Chinese in their efforts to
plug this too? Enhanced Chinese presence in this
sector, which resumption of trade would involve, could
have a deterrent effect on refugees wanting to flee
Tibet through the Sikkim route.
The over-attention during the visit to Chinese
sensitivities over the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)
of China with little attention to Indian sensitivities
either over Sikkim or over China's nuclear and missile
supply relationship with Pakistan is equally troubling.
According to the prime minister, as quoted in the
media, he did not raise the Pakistan issue at all
during the talks.
A joint declaration signed by the two prime ministers
says, "The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet
Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the
People's Republic of China and reiterates that it does
not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political
activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its
appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates
that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action
aimed at splitting China and bringing about
independence of Tibet. The Indian side recalled that
India was among the first countries to recognize that
there is one China and its one China policy remains
unaltered."
The Chinese did not hesitate to emphasize that there
is only one China, of which Tibet is a part, and
insist that this be included in the joint declaration.
Is it not the responsibility of any government in New
Delhi to similarly emphasize that there is only one
India, of which Sikkim is a part, and insist on this
being included in the statement too. Our prime
minister's apparent acceptance of a Chinese oral
assurance of a change in their Sikkim policy in the
future, without insisting on this being recorded in
writing, brings to mind Indira Gandhi's acceptance in
1972 of Pakistan's Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto's oral
assurance that he would accept the Line of Control in
Jammu and Kashmir as the international border after
preparing public opinion in Pakistan to accept it,
without reducing his commitment to writing in the
Shimla Agreement. He subsequently denied giving any
such assurance. We never learn from our follies.
The India-China (Panchsheel) Agreement on Tibet signed
on April 29, 1954, had referred to Tibet as the "Tibet
region of China". Thereafter, when the then Indian
prime minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, a
Sino-Indian joint press communique issued on December
23, 1988, said that "Tibet is an autonomous region of
China". It said, "The Indian side reiterated the
long-standing and consistent policy of the government
of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China
and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan
elements are not permitted on Indian soil."
Strictly speaking, New Delhi is right in saying that
substantively there has been no change in India's
position on Tibet. What is new and troubling is the
much stronger language used now and the Chinese
insistence on this stronger formulation. In a media
briefing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman even
went further than this and claimed that the Indian
prime minister had accepted that the TAR is an "inalienable"
part of China, but this expression is not found in the
joint declaration.
Among the troubling questions that come to mind are:
The Tibetan exiles have always alleged that the
present TAR is smaller than the Tibetan region first
occupied by China. According to them, part of the
Tibetan territory was separated by the Chinese after
occupation and merged with adjoining provinces. What
was left was named the TAR. By accepting the new
formulation, has India consciously or unconsciously
legitimized the Chinese action in doing so?
Will India's apparent yielding to Chinese pressure for
a stronger formulation mark the beginning of further
Chinese pressure on India to stop the non-religious
activities of the Dalai Lama's setup in Dharamsala in
India?
Will it cut the ground from under the feet of the
Dalai Lama in his efforts to achieve genuine autonomy
for the homeland of the Tibetans and protection of
their culture and religion through talks with Beijing?
Apparently anticipating criticism back home of the new
formulation, the prime minister has claimed that the
Tibetans were consulted during the negotiations. The
Hindu of June 28 has reported as follows, "The prime
minister revealed that 'Tibetan friends' had been
consulted by the government prior to his tour and even
during the course of the China visit. 'They are
satisfied with India's spin'."(The prime minister's
words as claimed by the paper) What spin, one wonders.
A spin on the Chinese or Indian people?
While Dharamsala has not yet come out with any
official reaction, a web site maintained by Tibetan
exiles abroad has described Vajpayee's discussions
with the Chinese on Tibet as "semantic diplomacy" and
said, "While political scientists may be able to
explain the implication of the difference between
these formulations, the statement contained in the
joint declaration seems to be an attempt to meet
Chinese desire to legitimize control over Tibet.
However, the fact that there was hot discussion on the
formulation seems to be clear from leaked reports
released by Xinhua in which China talked about India
recognizing Tibet as an 'inalienable' part of China.
The joint declaration does not contain any such
reference'."
The uncertain aspect of the outcome relates to the
agreement to "each appoint a special representative to
explore from the political perspective of the overall
bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary
settlement". Is this just another layer of cosmetics
to conceal the lack of significant progress in the
ongoing negotiations at the official and expert level
to find a solution to the border dispute, or does it
mark an innovative mechanism to expedite the search
for a solution in a time-bound manner?
The prime minister has been quoted as saying, "The
kind of talks that I have had on the boundary issue
during this visit have perhaps never taken place
before." Only time can say how far his optimism is
justified.
The gratifying part of the visit relates to the
various measures agreed to for further promoting
bilateral trade and strengthening economic cooperation.
This is the non-controversial part of the outcome and
needs no comment.
B Raman is Additional Secretary (ret), Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and presently
director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai;
former member of the National Security Advisory Board
of the Government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He
was also head of the counter-terrorism division of the
Research & Analysis Wing, India's external
intelligence agency, from 1988 to August, 1994.
Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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