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Congressional
Human Rights Caucus (CHRC) Members' Briefing:
The Human Rights Situation of Uighurs in the
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Prepared by senior researcher Mickey Spiegel,
and delivered by Asia division advocacy director Veena
Siddharth.
April 27, 2005
Thank you for inviting Human Rights Watch to testify
before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on the
subject of China’s human rights record in the
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (hereafter Xinjiang).
While there is religious repression in other parts of
China, what takes place in Xinjiang is particularly
virulent. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China
have jointly released Devastating Blows: Religious
Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, which speaks to the
current state of China’s compliance with international
instruments relating to the core freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, and religion among
others.
Today, some 60 percent of Xinjiang’s population is of
Central Asian origin––as against 94 percent in 1949;
of those, 8 out of 9 are Turkic-speaking Uighurs.
Almost all Uighurs are Muslims. Had it not been for a
major government initiative begun in the early 1990s
to foster ethnic Chinese migration into Xinjiang
through economic and land ownership incentives, the
percentage of Muslims and particularly Uighurs would
have been considerably higher. Statistics indicate
that despite overall economic growth in the region,
ethnic Chinese have tended to be the major
beneficiaries.
Anecdotal and sometimes conflicting reports of
specific instances of human rights abuses against
Uighurs in Xinjiang have circulated for years,
increasing in frequency and complexity after Uighurs
mounted a major protest against the central government
in the city of Baren in 1990. In the wake of that
protest, the government initiated a series of policies
aimed at tightening control over the region
The collection of Chinese government documents in
Devastating Blows, some of which were revealed there
for the first time, makes clear that the abuses were
not random local cadre excesses. Rather, they were
part of a systematic and sustained attack, centrally
controlled by the Chinese government and Chinese
Communist Party, on an ethno-nationalist group
perceived as a threat to the stability and
cohesiveness of the Chinese state. China’s leaders
perceived Islam, its belief structure and its societal
arrangements, as central to Uighur identity. That is
why, in its effort to undermine Uighur cohesiveness
and to force loyalty to the State, the government
chose to crack down on religious expression.
Religion is just one means of Uighur self-expression
that Chinese authorities equate with separatism, and
even terrorism. There have been some incidences of
attacks on political leaders, prisons officials,
police stations, and military installations. In 1997,
three simultaneous bus bombings in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s
capital, killed nine civilians and seriously wounded
many more. However, the Chinese government has refused
to differentiate violent so-called separatist
tendencies from non-violent acts or artistic
expressions of nationalist longings. Authorities have
gone a step further, equating separatist sentiment
with ties to international terrorism. Even Chinese
authorities acknowledge that there are only a few
Uighurs who have resorted to violence in campaigning
for autonomy and preservation of their culture,
language and religion.
As part of their approach, officials crafted an
intensive and thorough-going program to reeducate
imams (religious leaders) so that their first
loyalties would be to the state; vetted all religious
literature, past and present, even going so far as to
mandate what version of the Koran could be used; razed
mosques on the grounds that the number exceeded the
need; initiated a rectification drive to cleanse Party
ranks of Uighurs unwilling to wholeheartedly abide by
all religious directives, and initiated campaign after
campaign to sentence, both judicially and
administratively, young Uighur men who joined
“illegal” organizations, distributed “illegal”
religious material, or who simply thought
“reactionary” religious thoughts.
Many of the restrictions are articulated in the
“Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Regulations on the
Management of Religious Affairs (2001).” Among the
most telling sections are those which insist that
those involved in religion, as believers, clergy, or
“organizations” “must support the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system, love
their country and abide by its laws, safeguard the
unification of the motherland and national solidarity,
and oppose national splittism and illegal religious
activities,” as well as “accept the supervision of the
religious affairs bureaus of the people's government,”
and “educate citizen believers in patriotism,
law-abiding and living in harmony.” In addition, the
regulations prohibit “mass religious activity which
spans different localities.”
Additional documents detail “Party Disciplinary
Actions Against Communist Party Members and Party
Organizations Involved in Violations of Political
Discipline in the Struggle Opposing National
Separatism and Safeguarding the Unification of the
Motherland,” the “Specific Scope of State Secrets in
Religious and Ethnic Affairs,” and excerpts from a
“Manual for Urumqi Municipality Ethnic Religious Work”
which answers such questions as: “What are the four
fundamental principles and guiding principles on
religious work set forth by Comrade Jiang Zemin?”,
“What qualifications must religious personnel possess?”,
and “What are illegal religious activities?”.
Interviews with Uighurs in Xinjiang and elsewhere
provide evidence of the way such policy initiatives
played out on the ground. At one extreme there are the
stories of campaigns and sweeps designed to sidestep
judicial protections. Despite their billing as
anti-crime initiatives, key targets have included
separatist and religious extremists. Such campaigns
are characterized by hundreds of arrests, swift
judicial processing, minimal procedural protections,
and mass sentencing rallies. Claims of torture have
surfaced repeatedly.
But interviewees were also quick to explain examples
of the kinds of intermittent harassment directed at
daily activities that helped cement Uighur identity.
Uighurs whose personal appearance suggested religious
devotion––a man sporting a beard or a woman covering
her head––found employment opportunities closed off.
School authorities looked askance at children who
celebrated religious holidays or fasted during
Ramadan. At times they were threatened with expulsion.
Security personnel broke up meetings of young men who
joined together to discuss common everyday problems.
I turn now to two of the most ubiquitous and
thorough-going campaigns, the one directed at
reforming the thought of imams; the other directed at
expunging religion from students’ experience. Both
campaigns take into account the government’s
appreciation that realization of an atheist state, the
Communist ideal, will be a long, slow process. Imams
command respect; their opinions carry weight. Should
they be “persuaded” to toe the government line, or as
is more likely, should those who are unreliable be
banned from leadership roles, the job of converting
rank and file Muslims to the government view is made
easier. As for children, the point of the campaign is
to disallow family influences that might strengthen
adherence to religious beliefs at odds with official
views.
Religious training for imams, led by Party and
government officials, began in earnest in 2001 with
some 8,000 imams obliged to take part. In addition to
speeches and written and oral examination on the
content of regulations and Party policies, those in
attendance were required to participate in “exchange
of experience” sessions which closely resembled the
“criticism/self-criticism” sessions prevalent in the
Maoist era. Imams had to confess their errors of
commission and omission and to examine their
“incorrect” ideas, and they had to point out similar
errors on the part of their colleagues. As Devastating
Blows explains:
“These sessions are purposely designed as loyalty
tests. If clerics do not offer precise accounts, they
are viewed as being insincere about opposing
separatism. But if they admit mistakes, they are
considered guilty of violating regulations. This
serves to put continuous pressure on the clerics. The
imam’s “attitude” is monitored by instructors during
the training. Final evaluations are recorded in the
imam’s personal file, which is kept by the religious
affairs bureaus. “
Directives aimed at students targeted both youngsters
under 18 and college age students. The former were
forbidden from obtaining a religious education. The
latter were targeted in a 2001- 2002 “clean-up”
campaign. Books disappeared from libraries, teachers
and students and teachers were monitored for
compliance with the Party line, and authorities
threatened college-age students with expulsions should
they follow the core requirements of Islam, for
example, perform the required five daily prayers, read
the Koran, or fast during Ramadan. Teachers at some
locales were made responsible for their students’
compliance with the new directives. In addition,
on-going surveillance, random searches, and
encouragement to report suspect activities and
discourse increased, students increasingly refrained
from talking about religion or expressing unacceptable
political opinions.
In light of the above summary of human rights abuses
in Xinjiang, particularly as they pertain to religious
freedom, I urge members of this Committee to directly
contact the Chinese Ambassador and in other ways
communicate your concern to Chinese authorities,
particularly on the following points:
The United States should not, for political
convenience, acquiesce in any future demands from
China to place organizations on lists of terrorist
organizations without sufficient evidence.
The US should continue the practice of not returning
Uighurs to China, including those accused of terrorist
acts or other crimes, so long as they are likely to be
at risk of being tortured upon return.
In dialogue with the Chinese government, the US should
stress that religion in Xinjiang, and the practice of
Islam in particular, should not be subject to
government interference or approval.
The right of children and young adults to worship,
obtain religious education, and express their religion,
including through dress, should be respected. The
right of parents and legal guardians to provide
religious education to their children likewise should
be respected.
The unjustified detention, maltreatment, and torture
of Uighur religious prisoners should halt immediately,
and all those imprisoned for their peaceful religious
practices or religious beliefs should be freed.
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