|
CHINA: For
religious freedom, patience may be the virtue
By Magda Hornemann, Forum 18 News Service
As China's National People's Congress passed
constitutional amendments addressing the issue of
human rights, outside the congress doors the secret
police was crushing possible dissent. Religious
believers, including a Catholic bishop and a
Protestant house church leader, were among those
detained. Two other Protestants who researched the
2003 crackdown on unofficial churches in Hanzhou had
just been indicted, while hundreds of thousands of
Falun Gong practitioners, thousands of Protestants and
many Vatican-loyal Catholics and other believers
languish in prisons and labour camps. Communist
ideological opposition to religion remains strong,
despite attempts to couch it in milder terms, combined
with fears ¨C rooted in Chinese history ¨C of foreign
religious involvement. The Party also fears rival
organisations with the power to mobilise adherents.
Few believers expect anything more than incremental
improvements.
When the legislative session of China's 10th National
People's Congress concluded in Beijing on 14 March,
delegates counted among their achievements the passage
of several amendments to the state constitution. In
particular, two amendments caught the eye. One added
to Article 13 the explicit provision that "citizens'
lawful private property is inviolable", reflecting the
government's determination to continue its policy of
economic liberalisation and, in the process,
bolstering the key component of Jiang Zemin's "Three
Represents" theory ¨C the inclusion of the "bourgeoisie"
in the Communist regime. It is therefore little wonder
that observers both inside and outside China greeted
the passage of this amendment with much optimism.
However, the other amendment, or more appropriately "addition"
to the constitution, encountered considerably greater
scepticism: "The State respects and safeguards human
rights." Observers are understandably unimpressed with
this new provision. After all, the constitution
already includes many provisions for the "respect for"
and "protection" of various civil liberties and human
rights, including religious freedom. Yet, the
Communist party-state continues to violate these human
rights.
This latest constitutional addition seems to be merely
another symbolic gesture from the Communist dictators.
Still, notwithstanding doubts about just how this
latest change would be reflected in actual practices,
the need that the Communist regime felt to include
this commitment may indicate at least some interest on
the part of the Hu Jintao government to address
widespread concerns about its human rights record. At
the very least, it reflects increasing debate among
officials and scholars on the need for reforms,
particularly in the legal sector, to eliminate
government abuses and violations of human rights.
However, one should not hold one's breath in
anticipation of any immediate change. The reason is
apparent. Just as the legislature approved this
constitutional revision, the state public security
apparatus was busy outside the Great Hall of the
"People" to prevent any demonstration or dissident
activity that could "hinder" the legislature's ability
to proclaim that the state is ready to protect the
human rights of its citizens. According to the
US-based Human Rights in China, the Beijing city
government deployed some 1,000 public security
officers to deter unwanted dissident activities. As
part of the security measures, foreign Internet sites
were blocked, while potential dissidents and activists
around the country were arrested, detained or placed
under surveillance. Meanwhile, political prisoners
continue to fill prisons and labour camps. The irony
is clear for all to see: human rights were violated
just as the government proclaimed publicly that it
would "respect" and "safeguard" human rights.
This effort to curb dissident activities was also
extended to believers. On 5 March, the day the
National People's Congress opened, Roman Catholic
Bishop Wei Jingyi of Qiqihar in Heilongjiang province
was arrested. On the same day, the police arrested,
detained and beat Hua Huiqi, an unofficial house
church leader in Beijing. Just a little over a week
before the opening day of the legislative session,
international media reported the indictment of two
members of the unofficial Protestant Church. They were
charged with collecting "state secrets" after
conducting research about the large-scale government
crackdown on unofficial Protestant congregations in
summer 2003 in the city of Hanzhou in the southeastern
province of Zhejiang.
Indeed, believers have suffered greatly as a result of
government repression. According to Falun Gong
practitioners, ever since the government crackdown
against the group and its practitioners began in 1999,
more than 900 have died as a result of police
brutality, while hundreds of thousands have been
arrested and detained without due process, with over
100,000 sent to labour camps. In addition, more than
1,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been forcibly
admitted to psychiatric hospitals to coerce them to
renounce their belief. Meanwhile, thousands of
Protestants affiliated with unofficial congregations
are in prisons or labour camps. According to the
US-based Cardinal Kung Foundation, all Roman Catholic
bishops who expressed open allegiance to the Vatican
while refusing to associate with the state are
imprisoned, while scores of priests and laypeople have
been arrested and detained. All the while, the
government exercises strict control over Tibetan
Buddhist-populated areas and Xinjiang, where the
Uighur Muslims continue to be victims of the regime's
ongoing "assimilate or eliminate" campaign.
How to account for the Communist regime's policy of
repression against religions? Certainly, a major
factor can be found in the Communist ideology. The
atheistic nature of Communism assures that a Communist
regime's relationship with religious organisations and
persons will be antagonistic. As an official policy
codified in various party regulations and documents,
the Communist Party bars its members from adhering to
any religious belief or participating in religious
activities.
Twenty years after Deng Xiaoping initiated
liberalising reforms, the Communist Party's most
ardent ideologues maintain that Communism and religion
are diametrically opposed. This fundamental view is
reflected in official media and discussions within the
Communist Party-state. In November 2003, a Chinese "scholar"
contributed an article to the People's Daily, the
Communist Party flagship newspaper, entitled "An
Historical Study of the Communist Party of China's
Theory and Policy Concerning Religion". "To uphold the
fundamental opposition in world outlook of Marxism and
religion," the scholar wrote, "it is of course
essential to uphold the fundamental opposition of
science and religion. Religion is an illusory, inverse
reflection of the external world, whereas the task of
science is to understand the objective world in
accordance with reality, advocating seeking truth from
facts and pursuing objective truth."
Indeed, many ideologues continue to view religion
through the Marxist framework, arguing that the "problem"
of religion would disappear once the fruit of economic
modernisation becomes more widespread.
Yet, even as the party-state continues to pay lip
service to the ideologues among its ranks, it is also
clear that an increasing number of party and state
officials and intellectuals are less comfortable than
before about being perceived to adhere to such a
strong ideological position. However, the ruling
elites are not replacing their faith in Communism with
new-found religious beliefs: far from it. The state
continues to view religion with considerable hostility.
The difference now is that such hostility is couched
in milder terms.
In December 2001, the central government held its
first national religious affairs work conference in
over a decade. Jiang Zemin, as head of the Communist
Party and the country's president, delivered "important"
remarks acknowledging that religion will long continue
to exist in China and in the world. Cautioning against
underestimating the impact religion has on China's
political, social and economic developments, he called
for the "strengthening" of the party-state's work on
religious affairs. Zhu Rongji, who was the third most
senior Communist Party leader and the state premier,
followed up Jiang's remarks with even harsher comments,
calling for continued strong crackdowns against "cults"
and "illegal religious activities".
These recent comments by senior leaders suggest that
there are other dimensions to why the Chinese
Communist party-state so fundamentally opposes
religious organisations and activities. Ideology aside,
practical reasons can explain the party-state's policy.
The Communist Party is known as a "mass" party: its
ability to mobilise the masses, particularly the
peasantry, was the key ingredient to its success in
achieving political power. Its ability to maintain
power, therefore, must necessarily be based on its
capacity to retain sole control of that mobilisational
mechanism.
In the two decades since Deng initiated economic
liberalisation and re-opening to the international
community, religion has become firmly established and
religious adherents are on the rise. Non-government
sources estimate that Protestant Christians alone may
account for as many as 80 million, nearly 10 percent
of China's population. Falun Gong practitioners made
similar claims about the size of the group's
membership in mainland China at its height in 1998.
Even the state's conservative estimates indicate that
there are at least 100 million believers of all faiths
throughout China, including regions like Tibet and
Xinjiang where many residents harbour strong
anti-China sentiments.
Whatever the actual number may be, one should not be
surprised that the party-state is concerned about the
impact that religion has on China's development or,
more specifically, the development of the Communist
Party. The party-state will not ignore other
organisations that have a demonstrated capacity to
mobilise the masses effectively. For this reason, the
leadership under Jiang Zemin was shocked and disturbed
that 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners could suddenly
appear on the doorsteps of its compound. To make
matters worse, these peaceful demonstrators showed up
in precisely the same place that students had staged
their initial appeals just ten years earlier. There is
an additional ironic twist to the emergence of groups
like the Falun Gong. In the late 1980s, in a campaign
to mobilise indigenous culture in the face of foreign
"spiritual pollution", the government actively
promoted qigong, a form of Chinese exercises the
principles of which provided a base for the later
emergence of Falun Gong. Little did the state realise
then that these organisations would eventually acquire
an independent attitude to the state.
This suggests another important element contributing
to the government's religious policy ¨C history. China
has a long historical tradition. Chinese are intensely
interested in history. Even those whose professions
may be in the field of science and technology espouse
a genuine interest in it. For the Chinese, the present
is unmistakably intertwined with the past, and the
past offers lessons for the future. The Communist
leaders are no different. They are keenly aware that
throughout China's long history, many popular
rebellions and insurrections took place in the name of
religion. The most recent, in the middle of the 19th
century, lasted for nearly 20 years and witnessed a
rebel force occupying nearly all of southern China.
The Taiping Rebellion, led by a disgruntled Confucian
scholar who claimed to be Jesus Christ's Chinese
brother, taxed the resources of the Manchu government.
The central government was able to crush the rebellion
only thanks to foreign assistance and the rebel
force's internal fissures. These historical lessons
are not lost on today's leaders and even intellectuals.
The elites are not shy about pointing out these
historical facts when confronted with accusations that
the state is repressing religion.
Organised internal dissension in the name of religion,
however, is only half the story. China's modern
history has been characterised as much by internal
divisions as by its semi-colonial status vis-a-vis the
Western powers. The West's economic and military push
into China during the 18th and 19th centuries was
accompanied by Christian missionaries. While it is
true that among the Christian missionaries were many
with less interest in the condition of Chinese "souls"
than in seeking private gain, many others contributed
greatly towards helping China become more modernised
than ever before. Still, the nationalism from which
the Communist regime derived its legitimacy is based
on a sense of victimisation from exploitation by
Western powers, whose actions were, more perceived
than in reality, facilitated at least in part by
foreign missionaries. This perceived connection
between foreign governments and religious groups in
their societies was so strong that the regime, as soon
as it came to power, established "patriotic" religious
organisations with the primary aim of ensuring that
Chinese religious organisations would no longer come
under the influence of foreign religious groups.
For this same reason, the state reacted vehemently
when on 1 October 2000 (the founding date of the
People's Republic of China) the Pope canonised over
100 Chinese and Western Roman Catholics. Many of the
new saints had lost their lives in the 1900 Boxer
Rebellion, a state-sponsored anti-foreign movement
that used violence against foreigners and their
Chinese sympathisers. Similarly, the Chinese
government continues to insist that any normalisation
of relations between China and the Vatican must
include the Roman Catholic Church's assurances that it
will not interfere in the affairs of the Catholic
Church in China.
This fear and belief that religious organisations
might be connected with foreign entities promoting
activities antithetical to Chinese interests have
apparently gone beyond traditional Western religions
like Christianity. Even Falun Gong, a spiritual group
that has indigenous Chinese roots, has been a victim
of this perception. For example, one Chinese Falun
Gong practitioner who resides outside the country
claimed that during a recent visit back home to China,
he was arrested and interrogated by officials who
identified themselves as agents of the state security
apparatus responsible for the state's
counter-intelligence and counter-espionage efforts.
According to this practitioner, these officials
insisted that the Falun Gong organisation must have
been on the payroll of the US Central Intelligence
Agency with the aim of subverting the Chinese
government.
These accounts indicate that the regime also views
religion through the lens of nationalism and, by
extension, territorial sovereignty. Indeed, this is
the framework through which the Communist party-state
views believers and activities in ethnic minority "autonomous"
regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. In Tibet - where the
Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader and, in the minds
of most Tibetans, the real political leader - the
Communist regime has cracked down harshly against all
Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns who refuse to renounce
their allegiance to him. In Xinjiang, where the Uighur
Muslims, a Turkic people, make up the largest ethnic
population and among which there is increasing
nationalist sentiment, the Chinese government has used
its "cooperation" with the US-led global
anti-terrorism campaign as a justification for
intensifying its crackdown against the Uighurs. This
is why Rebiya Kadeer, at one time the wealthiest woman
in Xinjiang, continues to languish in prison accused
of providing "state secrets" ¨C newspaper clippings ¨C
to foreigners.
To implement its repressive policy, the Communist
regime has promulgated various regulations and created
government institutions. It has also used the "patriotic"
organisations as a means to ensure that the
party-state retains complete control over the
religious sector. The regulations cover a range of
activities, from the registration of religious
facilities, the "appropriate" relationship between
Chinese religious organisations and their foreign
counterparts, and what constitute "cults" and "cultic"
activities. The institutions make up an extensive
network of party and state agencies. In some cases,
like the campaign against the Falun Gong, China's most
senior leaders are apparently directly involved in
taking decisions. Other cabinet-level agencies like
the public security and state security ministries are
also involved, particularly in tackling organisations
and activities that have not been officially
sanctioned.
Generally, the Communist Party's United Front Work
Department acts as the key policy coordination agency
while the State Administration for Religious Affairs
(SARA) of the State Council, the government, is the
primary agency responsible for implementing religious
policies. Recently, hints have emerged of considerable
tension within the government about the appropriate
religious policies, as well as between the party and
the government. According to a February 2004 Compass
Direct report, the United Front Work Department and
the SARA have disagreed over whether Protestant house
churches might register directly with the government
without going through the state-sanctioned Protestant
organisation, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM).
Yet, at least for now and on the surface, the party
and the state share a consensus on the need to
maintain control over religion.
Just as there may be different attitudes within the
party-state about the appropriate religious policies,
different religious communities have also reacted
differently to the regime's repression. The most
obvious difference seems to be that between the Falun
Gong movement and the unofficial Protestant house
churches. As noted earlier, Falun Gong practitioners
have demonstrated their willingness and the
organisational strength to confront state repression.
Even after the state crackdown began in 1999, Falun
Gong practitioners regularly appeared in Beijing's
Tiananmen Square, the site of China's greatest mass
demonstration in the past two decades, to push their
case for official recognition of the movement's
legitimacy. Whereas the Falun Gong practitioners have
displayed surprising organisational capacity,
Protestant house churches seem to possess very little
cohesiveness. Indeed, with tens of millions of members
among their congregations, this community has the
potential to become a major social force.
Yet, the house churches, at least until now, seem
genuinely uninterested in confronting the state. In
fact, its leaders have advocated a separation of
church and state. Moreover, some house church leaders
say their groups are more concerned about internal
divisions and attacks by "heretics" and "cults" like
the "Eastern Lightning" (whose leader has claimed she
was Christ incarnate) than they are about state
repression. The house churches have not made any
effort to reach out to other religious groups and
indeed have tried to cooperate with the state to halt
the spread of "cults" like the Eastern Lightning which,
they maintain, has used violence to abduct house
church leaders and members.
As the above indicates, religious conditions in China
remain complex and potentially volatile. This
volatility is likely to increase as religion becomes
more widespread throughout China and if the Chinese
government remains focused on exercising complete
control over religious organisations, individuals and
activities. Moreover, advances in information
technology have made Chinese believers increasingly
aware of the support they enjoy among transnational
actors like foreign religious organisations, human
rights advocates and governments.
In the long run, how religious conditions develop in
China will depend greatly on how these different
variables interact. In the short run, however, the
actions of the Communist party-state will remain
decisive. While the new administration led by
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabo may usher in
positive changes, such changes are likely to be
incremental, particularly since the new leaders are
still trying to consolidate their political power.
Like all things in China, we will just have to wait
and see.
A printer-friendly map of China is available from
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/
atlas/index.html?Parent=asia&Rootmap=china
|
