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China's new line-up
Who's in charge now?
Is it Hu Jintao, or Jiang Zemin, or even Zeng Qinghong
who is emperor after the 16th Party Congress?
"AN IMPORTANT sign of a political party's maturity is
whether or not it can groom reliable successors." This
was the benchmark set by Hu Jintao, then heir apparent
to the Chinese Communist Party's top post, in a speech
in April 2000. Vice-President Hu, who took up his long
pre-ordained position as party chief last week, warned
that the collapse of communism elsewhere and the
toppling of Taiwan's Kuomintang were mainly caused by
a "bad choice" of people to take control of these
one-party dictatorships. As Mr Hu doubtless sees it,
his task now is to prove to his sceptical predecessor,
Jiang Zemin,
that nothing like that will happen in China.
Mr Jiang's lack of confidence in Mr Hu was made
abundantly clear on November 15th, when the newly
appointed general secretary led his eight colleagues
in the Politburo Standing Committee in a brief and
awkward line-up before the world's media. Five, or by
some analysts' reckoning, six, of the identikit
dark-suited, red-tied men (all nine of them engineers
by training) are Mr Jiang's protégés. Mr Hu, who was
pencilled in for the top job ten years ago by the late
Deng Xiaoping, not by Mr Jiang, finds himself
surrounded by people of questionable loyalty to
himself. And Mr Jiang, though now retired
from the Politburo, remains in charge of the Central
Military
Commission-commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in
effect-a position that gives him enormous power.
It is still far from clear when the 76-year-old Mr
Jiang plans to step down completely. He is
constitutionally obliged to give up his post as state
president at the annual session of the rubber-stamp
parliament, the National People's Congress, next March
(Mr Hu is almost certain to pick up that insignificant
title). But Mr Jiang could stay on as military chief
indefinitely. The benign interpretation is that he
wants to stay around only as long it takes to make
sure the new leadership is stable. More likely is that,
like all his predecessors, he does not want fully to
relinquish power until ill-health or death force him
to do so. Even if Mr Jiang gives up his military
position, he is sure to go on using his protégés to
exert behind-the-scenes influence.
Mr Jiang might have felt happier about retiring if his
closest ally, Zeng Qinghong, were now in Mr Hu's
position. But upsetting Deng's succession arrangements
might have fuelled dangerous resentment within the
party. So Mr Zeng has to be content as number five in
the new hierarchy (he is likely to pick up the
additional title of state vice-president next March).
This, however, will not prevent him from being a
powerful potential rival to Mr Hu. As chief of the
party's Organisation Department until last month, Mr
Zeng played a key role in the selection of officials
for promotion in the build-up to the Communist Party's
16th Congress, which preceded the Politburo shuffle.
He heads the party's secretariat, which also has a big
say in appointments. Mr Zeng is thus exceptionally
well placed to expand his extensive network of
patronage.
Nothing in the published remarks of Mr Hu, Mr Zeng or
indeed Mr Jiang even hints at any policy difference
between them. Mr Hu's remarks have always been
deferential to Mr Jiang. He pledged in a secret
acceptance speech to "seek instruction" from his
predecessor. He has also been full of praise for Mr
Zeng, who at 63 is three years his senior. Mr Zeng, in
turn, often peppers his speeches with quotations from
Mr Hu. Yet Mr Zeng is an ambitious
and skilful politician, whereas Mr Hu has
distinguished himself only by ploddingly carrying out
his duties.
The power Mr Zeng enjoys, indeed flaunts, is widely
resented. "If Mr Zeng wanted to become the number one,
officials and ordinary Chinese would find it
unacceptable, not because he's bad or has connections
with any particular person, but just because of the
way he behaves," says a Chinese academic.
Interestingly, though, Mr Zeng has spoken with unusual
frequency on the need for at least a limited degree of
political reform, such as more openness and public
involvement in the selection and supervision of
officials.
Two of Mr Jiang's other protégés on the new Standing
Committee are also controversial figures. Number four
in the hierarchy is Jia Qinglin, who until recently
served as party chief in Beijing. Mr Jia was the party
secretary of the coastal province of Fujian during the
emergence there in the 1990s of a huge smuggling ring
in the port city of Xiamen. Many officials say he
failed to respond effectively, yet was protected from
censure because of his closeness to Mr Jiang. The new
number eight, Li Changchun, was party chief in the
central province of Henan in the mid-1990s, when
thousands of villagers were infected with HIV at
official blood-collection centres, news of which he
tried to suppress.
In addition to Mr Zeng, Mr Jiang has also succeeded in
installing two other close associates from his days as
party chief of Shanghai in the 1980s-Huang Ju, who
himself served as Shanghai's party boss until last
month, and Wu Bangguo, a deputy prime minister who was
Shanghai's party secretary in the early 1990s. Mr Wu
is now second in the hierarchy and is likely to take
over as head of the parliament next March. Mr Huang is
number six.
By contrast, Zhu Rongji, who will retire as prime
minister next March, has managed to put just one
favourite, Wen Jiabao, into the Standing Committee.
Mr Wen, who is in the number three position, is likely
to take over the premiership. Li Peng, the much-hated
parliamentary chief, has secured only ninth position
for his ally Luo Gan. Mr Luo failed to secure the
anti-corruption portfolio, a role taken by Wu
Guanzheng, number seven in the hierarchy, whose
loyalties are uncertain. With rumours of corruption
swirling around members of his close family, Mr Li
might well be uneasy with this arrangement.
Mr Jiang clearly hopes to remain China's paramount
leader-as Deng was in "retirement"-for at least the
near future, making the question of whether the dull
and inscrutable Mr Hu might be a Gorbachev in disguise
less pressing. But Mr Hu's speeches so far have been
far from visionary. "Western hostile forces led by the
Americans are intensifying their efforts to westernise
and break us up," he said in May last year. "We must
lead our cadres to gain the upper hand in the struggle
between subversion and counter-subversion, containment
and counter-containment, separatism and
counter-separatism." The cadres get the message
Nov 21st 2002 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition
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