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Beijing’s growing
security dilemma in Xinjiang
The volatile mix of ethnic and religious repression
can only lead to a resumption of insurgency and
instability in Xinjiang with consequences for the
Chinese economy as well as the Uighur’s themselves.
By Martin Andrew for The Jamestown Foundation
(10/06/05)
China’s need for energy to fuel its burgeoning economy
means that Xinjiang is now critical to its future. The
Tarin Basin alone has proven reserves of over one
billion tons of crude and 59 billion cubic meters of
natural gas. These oilfields are expected to provide
50 million tons annually by 2010. Xinjiang is where
the last 240 kilometers of the new 3,000-kilometer
Kazakhstan to China oil pipeline will run into, where
the oil will be refined or sent eastwards. The Chinese
economy requires these resources for its industries
and energy craving cities on the east coast, so it
will brook no interruptions. The exploitation of
natural resources from the impoverished western
periphery to assist rich eastern cities will lead to a
backlash in relations between the Uighurs and the Han
Chinese, which will further strain relations between
the two groups. This will only exacerbate the Uighur’s
bitterness and distrust towards Beijing, giving them
another cause for Uighur independence and insurgency
against the Chinese.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been
one means of suppressing Muslim fundamentalism in its
member states, and China sees it as a useful tool for
influencing Central Asian affairs. In the future, this
organization could become a double-edged sword for
China since the spread of democracy and the increasing
desire for transparent governments in Central Asia
could have a threatening spill over effect in Xinjiang.
Democratically-influenced governments could change
their foreign policies when dealing with China, giving
tacit support for Uighur independence, or demanding
more rights for their Muslim brothers. Such a shift
could precipitate another mass migration of Han
Chinese into Xinjiang, further marginalizing the
Uighur population in the region. This in turn would
tend to radicalize Uighur separatists. The Chinese and
Kazakh government cannot secure the entire border, so
insurgents could establish bases in these remote
mountainous areas in much the same way that the Red
Army used mountainous areas to create its Soviets in
the 1930s. But on the other hand, the Chinese
government fears that granting independence to
Xinjiang could lead to the break up of the country,
similar to the late Soviet Union.
Vulnerable to attack
The new infrastructure, including oil refineries, the
pipeline, railways, power stations, and the power
grids are vulnerable to attack by insurgents who could
cause vast damage to China’s economy with little
effort. A Uighur “People’s War” would be a nightmare
for China. One way of keeping such an insurgency in
check is by displays of force, which Chinese security
forces have not been lax in showing. Xinjiang has
become the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) testing
ground for new tactics and equipment for high altitude
warfare. The Xinjiang Military Area Command has an
armored regiment that has as its mission to develop
mobile operations and field survival techniques in
high altitude warfare. Xinjiang is also required as a
training area for the PLA, which will need large areas
to develop its new concepts in high altitude warfare.
The annual exercise in Xinjiang also enables joint
exercises with its neighbors to refine command and
control arrangements with similar forces in the region.
Warfare test center
Xinjiang is not only important as a high altitude
training area. The Xinjiang Military Region, and not
the Nanjing Military District, has now become the
premier information warfare test center for the PLA.
Secondly, it is the training area for large-scale
operational level developments. Because of its
isolation and varied terrain, it has become the
premier training area for developing the new
“informatized” warfare that the Chinese military is
striving for. China can develop its idea of
information warfare in a relatively free airspace and
ground environment enabling the use of offensive
electronic warfare and large scale maneuvers away from
prying eyes and without interfering with commercial
activities. The Xinjiang military region recently saw
a series of exercises in the Taklimakan Desert where
it incorporated a C4I LAN into a division in an area
1,000 km long that integrated intelligence, command
and control, automated artillery fire support,
airspace surveillance and control and logistics
re-supply. Units in Xinjiang have been commended by
the PLA hierarchy as leading the way in the field of
C4I. This also means that if a series of insurgent
incidents were to occur simultaneously in different
parts of Xinjiang, security forces already have the
infrastructure and means to rapidly respond to them.
Information war
The Chinese have conducted an information war campaign
against the Uighurs in international forums by
labeling them terrorists and producing a white paper
and briefings outlining their crimes against China.
With two foreign cultures in the same area,
misunderstandings and incidents are bound to occur.
The Anti-Secessionist Law, recently passed by the
Politburo, applies equally to Xinjiang and Tibet, as
it does to Taiwan. Thus, China can now use the
criminal code to attack the Uighur independence
movements wherever it perceives them to be. To justify
the use of the PLA to suppress Uighur independence,
Chinese security forces have referred to the “war on
terror”. The Chinese State Council on 27 December 2004
released a White Paper on National Defense.
Non-traditional security threats like terrorism were
evoked throughout the paper, as in the following
passage: “China attaches great importance to security
cooperation in the non-traditional security fields
with other countries, maintaining that in jointly
combating non-traditional security threats, it is
imperative to address both the symptoms and root
causes and to adopt comprehensive measures.” The heavy
handedness of the Chinese security forces has, however,
defeated China’s heavy propaganda campaign. The
international media and the US were particularly
concerned with China’s detention of Rebiya Kadeer, the
prominent exiled Uighur businesswoman who was recently
released. The raiding without a warrant by Chinese
Security forces of the headquarters of Akida, the
company she owns, shows that they are still sensitive
to any perceived sentiments of Uighur independence.
Uighurs also perceive it as an example of Chinese
business interests trying to take over Uighur
businesses, with the assistance of Chinese security
forces. The crowds near the raid enabled Kadeer’s son,
Ablikim Abdiriyim, to escape by getting in the way of
Chinese security forces chasing him. The recent Human
Rights Watch report on Xinjiang outlines the daily
religious repression that the Chinese government
exerts on the Uighurs, and the methods the Chinese
government uses to repress them. The report includes
translations of Chinese neibu (internal use only)
documents outlining these methods.
Counter-terrorist exercises in Xinjiang
Running counter-terrorist exercises in Xinjiang
enables the Chinese Security forces to develop
counter-insurgency and terrorist techniques in the
area they would be expected to operate. For example,
on August 6, 2004 the first joint counter-terrorist
exercise between the PLA and Pakistani forces, called
“Friendship 2004” was run in Xinjiang. A high altitude
cold weather exercise, it comprised over 200 soldiers
that included personnel from the PLA’s dedicated
anti-terrorist battalion. The exercise scenario
entailed the searching and tracking down of terrorists
over Xinjiang’s mountainous terrain. The morning of 20
October 2004 saw an anti-hijacking exercise carried
out in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. It involved
more than 600 participants from various government
departments including Foreign Affairs, Public Security,
Fire, Civil Aviation as well as the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
and People’s Armed Police. It was organized jointly by
the national group responsible for counter terrorism
and its Xinjiang counterpart. The exercise was
primarily a command and control exercise to assist in
developing and testing procedures for the “
international cooperation in fighting terrorism.”
Xinjiang security forces faced a real hijacking on May
11, 2005 when a man armed with dynamite hijacked a bus
at a petrol station in Yining bound for Urumqi. Police
negotiated with the man, but he detonated a stick of
dynamite and was shot dead. Police said a family
dispute led to the man’s actions, who was not an
Uighur. Reuters reported on 13 September 2004 that
security forces in Xinjiang had prosecuted 22 cases of
groups and individuals for alleged “ separatist and
terrorist activities” in the period from January to
August 2004. A Chinese military newspaper noted that
Chinese forces have recently used tanks in a combat
zone. Given that the only area in China where combat
operations have occurred recently is Xinjiang, then
tanks were probably employed against Uighur insurgency.
‘Colonizers’
Many Uighurs view the Chinese as colonizers, and this
is bound to lead to further armed insurgency. Central
Asia is awash in infantry weapons including
rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and mortars
courtesy of the many wars that occurred in the region
in the 1990s. Chinese constructed infrastructure
designed to exploit Xinjiang’s mineral wealth offers
soft targets for these groups and the ability to deal
a major blow to China’s economy. As democracy expands
in Central Asia, there will be calls for more Uighur
representation and rights to the wealth from oil and
natural gas exports from the region. A change in
government by one of the eight nations that border
Xinjiang could see a government sympathetic to the
Uighurs’ plight. As any insurgent force requires
secure base areas to train and regroup from, a
sympathetic Central Asian government could provide
these covertly. If this occurred, the Uighurs could
adopt a more aggressive posture regarding the Chinese
security forces. To counter an increased insurgency,
the Chinese security forces have invested heavily in
updating their command and control to ensure a rapid
response to any outbreaks of violence. The volatile
mix of ethnic and religious repression can only lead
to a resumption of insurgency and instability in
Xinjiang with consequences for the Chinese economy as
well as the Uighur’s themselves.
This article originally appeared in Eurasia Daily
Monitor, published by The Jamestown Foundation in
Washington, DC., at (www.Jamestown.org). The Jamestown
Foundation is an independent, nonpartisan organization
supported by tax-deductible contributions from
corporations, foundations, and individuals
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