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World Report 2003: China, Tibet and Xinjiang
January 14, 2003
1. Human Rights Developments
2. Defending Human Rights
3. The Role of the International Community
Preparations for the 16th Chinese Communist Party
Congress and the accompanying change in China's top
leadership colored human rights practices in China in
2002. Concerned with maintaining economic and social
stability as the transition unfolded, leaders in
Beijing appeared to calculate carefully when to tread
lightly and when to crack down hard. They responded to
major, well-coordinated, and sustained worker protests
in China's northeast with only minimum force;
moderated the response to disclosures of their failure
to tackle the HIV/AIDS crisis effectively; and, when
accused of abusing psychiatric science by
incarcerating political offenders in mental hospitals,
expressed some willingness to cooperate with the World
Psychiatric Association. Chinese authorities continued
to reform the legal system and professionalize
judicial personnel, and agreed to include human rights
training for law enforcement officials as part of a
technical cooperation program with the U.N.
The leadership moved unequivocally, however, to limit
free expression and build a firewall around the
Internet, to destroy Falungong even beyond China's
borders, and to eliminate dissident challenges. In
Tibet, the government welcomed representatives of the
exiled Dalai Lama for the first time since 1993, even
as it continued to repress religious belief and
expression. In Xinjiang, however, the regime tightened
all restrictions, citing alleged Uighur collaboration
with al-Qaeda.
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
As Chinese media outlets continued to proliferate and
increasingly to challenge government guidelines,
propaganda authorities responded by obstructing the
free flow of information. They blocked major Internet
search engines, closed publications, harassed foreign
and domestic journalists, tightened controls on
satellite transmission, and hampered the work of
academics and activists. For two weeks in September,
officials blocked access to Google, a major search
engine, and diverted traffic to sites providing
officially approved content. When access was restored,
users reported selective blocking. Chinese authorities
appeared to be using packet sniffers--devices that
scan Internet transactions, including e-mail, to block
text with sensitive word combinations.
A second search engine, Altavista.com, was shut down
for a day, but Yahoo's China site escaped blockage.
Earlier in the year, along with some three hundred
other Internet companies, Yahoo had voluntarily signed
a trade-association-sponsored "Public Pledge on
Self-Discipline for China Internet Industry,"
committing itself to removing any information that the
government claimed could jeopardize security, disrupt
stability, break laws, or spread superstition.
The pledge mirrored Ministry of Information and
Technology regulations that went into effect in early
2002. They required Internet service providers to use
only domestic media news postings, to record
information useful for tracking users and their
viewing habits, to install software capable of copying
e-mails, and to immediately end transmission of
so-called subversive material.
Chinese authorities charged activists with subversion
for using the Internet to promote causes ranging from
political change to worker rights. In August, a Gansu
court sentenced Li Dawei to an eleven-year prison term
for downloading five hundred "counterrevolutionary"
essays and publishing them in book form. Lu Xinhua and
Wang Jinbo received four-year sentences for
criticizing Jiang Zemin. Party cadre Zhou Xiubao was
detained in July for an Internet posting calling for "true
Marxists" in the CCP to join together. In August,
public security officials detained Chen Shaowen for
articles on unemployment, legal defects, and social
inequities. By October 2002, courts still had not
announced verdicts in the cases of five activists
tried for Internet-related offenses in August and
September 2001.
A campaign to close unlicensed Internet cafés, begun
in April, gained momentum in June after a deadly fire
in a Beijing café, and culminated in October with the
promulgation of new regulations. They banned small
under-capitalized cafés, limited hours of operation,
banned users under sixteen, required identification
card registration, and permitted authorities to see
Internet use records. Most cafés had operated
illegally due to restrictive licensing regulations and
concomitant corruption.
Beginning January 1, Chinese authorities required
foreign television outlets to use a government "rebroadcast
platform" to distribute their channels, thus enhancing
official censorship capabilities. A few weeks earlier,
Beijing city authorities ordered the dismantling of
satellite dishes provided by cable television
companies to Chinese viewers. Revised "Provisions on
Management of Satellite TV" required universities,
hotels, residences, and government institutions to
reapply to view overseas cable and satellite
broadcasts. University departments had to prove
research need; hotels and foreign residence complexes
had to prove 80 percent foreign occupancy.
Restrictions on domestic print media escalated.
Several Party circulars ordered official newspapers to
use caution when reporting on sensitive issues and not
to publish reports downloaded from the Internet. One
circular reminded editors that all stories related to
central leaders and their families required approval
from "higher" authorities; that reports of major new
policies must reference Xinhua, the official news
service; and that even "objective" stories that might
affect stability or incite the public to demand
justice should not be published.
The official list of topics requiring caution included:
Taiwan, Tibet, and East Turkestan independence;
religious extremists and Falungong; the military;
social stratification; the south-north water diversion
project; advocacy of private ownership; taxes and fees
in rural areas; student loans; human genetic research;
private entrepreneurs as Party delegates; lawsuits
against the government; villagers who sold blood;
Forbes ranking lists; Confucian moral education in
primary schools; university rankings; the
Qinghai-Tibet railroad; and major accidents.
Authorities also added restrictions on reporting legal
cases.
In late 2001, after Securities Market Weekly published
an article critical of wealth amassed by National
People's Congress President Li Peng and his family,
authorities confiscated all copies of the issue. In
March 2002, officials at the Ministry of Propaganda
ordered Nanfang Zhoumuo (Southern Weekend) to remove a
feature story about financial irregularities at
Project Hope. The Communist Youth League controls the
foundation running the charity. In April, the magazine,
under pressure, fired three editors. The official
Worker's Daily came under fire for sympathetic
reporting on the plight of laid-off workers in China's
northeast. The Publicity Department of the Chinese
Communist Party warned against reporting on economic
restructuring and worker rights without considering
the "overall national interest"; conversely, the
department ordered positive reporting on the
government's efforts to help workers find new jobs.
In February, a Beijing district government office
issued a directive, "Regarding Strengthening the
Management of Events Involving Interviews with Foreign
Journalists," based on a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
document. The directive stipulated that only an
official in good political standing could speak for a
work unit; that a written report to the district
Foreign Affairs Office was required following an
interview; and that requests for conducting social
surveys or opinion polls be refused. The regulations
prohibited interviews with Falungong "elements" or
democracy campaigners, and on matters related to
ethnic minorities, religion, human rights, and family
planning. In November 2001, police officers detained a
German crew and a CNN cameraman filming a Falungong
protest, and confiscated film, press cards, residence
permits, and equipment. In June, police held
Chinese-Canadian journalist Jiang Xueqin for two days
for investigating labor unrest in the northeast.
Security officers beat a South Korean journalist
covering a scuffle in the South Korean consulate
between South Korean diplomats and Chinese guards. The
guards had dragged away a North Korean man seeking
asylum.
Authorities banned newsstand sales of Time for months
after it published an article about Falungong. In June,
the Economist was taken off newsstands for publishing
an eighteen-page survey arguing for political reform
in China. In July, officials blacked out BBC World
Service Television.
The publications and film industries were not spared.
In January, officials from the Party propaganda
department and from six ministerial bodies announced a
crackdown targeting political publications. In
September, the director of the State Press and
Publications Administration announced that "[a]ll
possible measures should be taken to ensure that the
publications market will not air voices that challenge
the Party's policies and unity." A listing of banned
books included best-selling novels, a scholarly work
on China's income gap, one about peasants relocated
from the Three Gorges dam area, and a series through
which intellectuals expressed discontents. New
regulations on film management permitted independent
production but only with approval from the relevant
State Council (China's executive body) department.
In September, the People's Daily warned cell phone
spam mailers that political rumor upset social
stability.
Chinese authorities moved cautiously in stemming
worker unrest, especially in northeastern cities where,
in March, tens of thousands of retired and laid-off
workers began the largest, longest, and best-organized
campaigns since the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations.
They were protesting non-payment of back wages and
pensions, unilateral rollbacks of severance agreements,
absence of a social security safety net, and
managerial corruption. In Liaoyang, security officers
attacked unarmed protestors, arresting four worker
representatives, Yao Fuxin, Pang Qingxiang, Xiao
Yunliang, and Wang Zhaoming, on charges of "illegal
assembly, marches, and protests." As of mid- November,
prison authorities had denied the men access to their
lawyers. In Daqing, security forces threatened
employed workers with job loss if their relatives
dared to protest. In all instances, Chinese
authorities flouted the right to free association
guaranteed in China's constitution and in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights which China has ratified. China also
has ignored its commitments as a member of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to respect the
right of freedom of association.
Other labor-related imprisonment occurred in 2002. On
May 30, a Sichuan province court sentenced Hu Mingjun
and Wang Sen, members of the banned China Democracy
Party, to eleven- and ten-year terms, respectively, on
subversion charges for supporting striking workers. On
June 1, Di Tiangui was detained in Shanxi province on
suspicion of subversion for trying to found a national
organization for retired workers.
In a developing trend, workers, migrant laborers, and
environmental activists began using the judicial
system to seek redress. The Beijing-based Center for
Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims scored some
successes.
Chinese authorities appeared conflicted as they
grappled with an impending HIV/AIDS epidemic in China,
admitting to a growing number of cases and
collaborating on education and prevention with the U.N.
and international agencies, but also attempting to
control information flows. The ambivalence was
clearest in relation to the detention and subsequent
release of Dr. Wan Yanhai, internationally recognized
for establishing Aizhi Action, an AIDS information
project, and for his advocacy on behalf of
AIDS-stricken villagers in Henan province. State
security officers seized Wan on August 24 for
circulating by e-mail an internal government document
about the Henan epidemic. The document detailed how,
after villagers sold their blood at government-run
health stations and workers extracted the plasma, the
workers injected villagers with the remaining pooled
blood products, creating a high risk of HIV
transmission. Wan was released on September 20
following an international outcry and a "confession"
admitting that publishing the report was a "mistake."
On September 13, Human Rights Watch and the Canadian
HIV/AIDS Legal Network presented Wan with the first "Award
for Action on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights," an
international award program established in 2002. He
had been chosen as a recipient months before his
detention.
Outspoken academics also continued to be targeted. In
January, police in Anhui detained retired professor
Wang Daqi for refusing to cease publishing the journal
Ecological Research. Wang, who had advocated the need
for political reform to stop environmental degradation,
was still in detention as of mid-November 2002.
A three-month "strike hard" (yan da) campaign
initiated in April 2001 to crack down on criminal
activity and speed the judicial process appeared to
have become a permanent feature of law enforcement in
China. Targets for 2002 included organized crime;
corrupt officials; and those labeled terrorists,
separatists, religious extremists, or members of "criminal
cults" such as Falungong practitioners. "Strike hard"
directives reward convictions, thus exacerbating due
process violations such as illegal detentions, hasty
trials, severe sentences, and a meaningless appeal
process. In Shanghai, where a judge's performance
rating is based on the number of cases handled, city
officials revealed that courts reduced "unnecessary
formalities during interrogation, evidence
presentation and court debates."
Although the government made changes to law
enforcement policies and procedures aimed at bringing
them closer to international standards, major
discrepancies existed between the policies as written
and as implemented. Changes in 2002 included new
disciplinary measures for corrupt or incompetent
judges; new educational and competency standards for
would-be judges, prosecutors, and lawyers; a code of
ethics for prosecutors; the introduction of a chief
prosecutor for each case rather than a prosecution
committee; a prohibition against firing judges without
proper legal procedures; and, as part of the effort to
eliminate corruption, annual internal disciplinary
court inspections. But local cadres and Party
officials still interfered in the criminal justice
system; criminal "confessions" elicited by torture
were admissible as evidence; and defense lawyers were
routinely denied access to their clients and to
prosecution witnesses.
Public security and state security officials, charged
with determining if sufficient evidence existed for a
case to be sent to the procuracy, a judicial agency
responsible for determining if sufficient evidence
exists to indict a suspected criminal offender,
routinely ignored legal time limits and refused to
tell family members the whereabouts of suspects. Yang
Jianli, a prominent dissident and permanent U.S.
resident, was detained on April 26 after having
entered China a week earlier on a friend's passport.
The Chinese government had refused to renew his own
passport. As of late October, Yang's family was still
unsure of his whereabouts. He had not had access to a
lawyer although he had been formally arrested on June
21. Without a copy of the arrest warrant, which local
authorities in Beijing refused to turn over, no lawyer
had been willing to take his case.
China's National Bar Association reported that 70
percent of criminal defendants were not represented, a
reflection of lawyers' fears that such cases
jeopardized their livelihoods and freedom. Lawyers
working on civil cases also faced repression. In
December 2001, authorities in Shenzhen told Zhou Litai,
whose practice was registered in another city, that he
could not continue to work in Shenzhen. He had been
representing injured and maltreated factory workers on
a contingency fee basis. According to the Lawyer's Law,
his license entitled him to practice anywhere in
China. In June, Zhang Jianzhong, head of the members'
rights committee of the Beijing Lawyers' Association,
was arrested on suspicion of perjury. China's Criminal
Law allows such a charge, which carries a prison term
of up to seven years, if a client's statements in
court contradict evidence obtained by public security
officials. The perjury charge is permissible even if
security officials used torture to obtain the original
"evidence."
Chinese authorities continued to imprison China
Democracy Party (CDP) leaders and to prevent CDP
members from working with overseas dissidents,
unemployed workers, or Falungong practitioners. At
this writing, there had been no further word about two
leaders: Zhao Zhongmin, detained after a routine
safety check on a train revealed that he was carrying
CDP materials; and Huang Shaoqin, traveling with him,
who managed to escape into hiding. Security agents
also have been on the lookout for overseas CDP members
trying to enter China. In mid-June, U.S. permanent
residents Wang Bingzhang and Zhang Qi--a leader of the
Zhong Gong health and meditation group--and
French-based former labor leader Yue Wu, went missing
in Vietnam. All three were believed to be CDP members.
Vietnam officials denied knowledge of the men's
whereabouts. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also denied
knowledge of the case after reports surfaced that the
two were being held in China.
At a major religious meeting in December 2001,
President Jiang Zemin announced that, "Under the
current international and domestic conditions, we can
only strengthen, not weaken, the Communist Party's
leadership and the government's control over religion."
Premier Zhu Rongji added that cults were not religion
and must be eliminated. Falungong practitioners faced
the most severe repression, but through use of an
expanded definition of "cult," officials "legally"
prosecuted a wide range of groups and believers. In
December 2001, "backbone" members of the Mentuhui (a
Christian group also known as the Society of Disciples)
in Gansu were administratively sentenced for
organizing "home sects," "cheating the people," and "disturbing
social order." Authorities announced the sentences at
a public rally called to "educate" the local
population. In January 2002, a Fujian court sentenced
Hong Kong resident Lai Kwong-keung to a two-year term
and a fine of approximately U.S.$18,000 for importing
bibles to China. Two codefendants from the mainland,
Lin Xifu and Yu Zhudi, received three-year terms. The
charges against Lai were reduced from "using a cult to
undermine...the law" to "illegal trading" after U.S.
President George Bush expressed concern. All three men
are members of the "Shouters," an evangelical
Christian group made up of small congregations without
professional clergy. Little more than a week after
sentencing, Lai was permitted to serve his term at
home under state surveillance. In April, the
arrangement was extended to Lin.
In February, members of the Holy Ghost Reform Church
received seven-year terms on charges of "using a cult
to undermine . . . the law." That same month, police
in Hubei province detained nine members of Wilderness
Narrow Door for setting up churches and meetings
points, "recklessly praying," and distributing cult
materials. In September, an appeals court overturned
death sentences for Gong Shengliang and four other
leaders of another Christian group, the South Church,
on grounds of insufficient evidence. They had been
charged with "fomenting an evil cult." At a new trial
in early October lasting less than three days, the
court sentenced Gong and two others to life in prison;
the remaining leaders received fifteen-year terms.
Within hours, the four who were acquitted received
three-year administrative sentences.
Falungong spokespersons reported that, as in previous
years, practitioners died in custody in 2002. (As of
November 12, spokespersons claimed that since start of
the crackdown in 1999, 513 practitioners had died in
custody.) Followers from abroad detained in China,
upon returning home, recounted tales of beatings and
torture. Courts continued to sentence core believers
to long prison terms; public security officials sent
others directly to reeducation camps. In December, a
Beijing court sentenced six academics to terms of up
to twelve years for distributing Falungong materials.
They were among some three hundred Qinghua University
students and staff detained at least temporarily in
connection with the Falungong crackdown. Nineteen
Falungong members, tried for hacking into television
stations in Chongqing Municipality or Changchun, Jilin
province to broadcast information about the
organization, received sentences ranging between four
and twenty years.
Relations between China and the Vatican remained tense.
According to FIDES, the Vatican news agency,
fifty-three bishops and priests remained in custody or
under police surveillance in February 2002. In June,
Religious Affairs Bureau officials "took away" Father
Chen Nailiang, the "underground" vicar general of
Wenzhou, Zhejiang province. In July, three priests
from Baoding, Hebei province received three-year terms
for disturbing the social order; thirty people, most
under eighteen, were detained briefly in Fujian
province for attending a secret catechism class.
Police interfered with two funerals for "underground"
bishops by blocking access roads.
China has not lived up to its obligation to refrain
from returning refugees to North Korea in situations
where their lives or freedom would be threatened (the
obligation of nonrefoulement). It has refused
permission for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to visit its border with North Korea to assess
the situation, although in a handful of cases, it did
permit UNHCR officials to interview asylum-seekers in
Beijing to determine refugee status. Instead, the
government responded to a spate of cases in which
North Koreans sought asylum in diplomatic missions in
Beijing and Shenyang by tightening security around the
compounds and at the North Korean border, demanding
that embassies and consulates hand over the
asylum-seekers, and prosecuting those who had helped
North Koreans to escape. Escapes have been to various
countries--not just China. Some 140 North Koreans who
managed to gain access to diplomatic facilities
negotiated safe passage to South Korea via a third
country.
Tibet
Chinese government permission for a "private" visit to
Tibet by personal representatives of the Dalai Lama,
and the release of seven high-profile Tibetan
prisoners before their terms expired opened a new
chapter in China-Tibet relations. The change in policy
may have indicated a greater Chinese readiness for
meaningful dialogue, or it may have been meant to mute
criticism from the international community and remove
a potential barrier to foreign investment.
For Tibetans, little changed. Authorities continued to
arrest "political" offenders and to place restrictions
on religious practice. Even as representatives of the
Dalai Lama met with local Tibetan government officials,
the latter accused the Dalai Lama of attempting to
split the motherland and insisted that talks about his
"individual future" were predicated on his willingness
to publicly state that Tibet and Taiwan were
inalienable parts of China. Throughout the visit, the
Dalai Lama's representatives assured officials that he
was seeking a "middle way," not independence but
"genuine autonomy" for Tibet.
Authorities continued to deny access to Gendun Choekyi
Nyima, the Panchen Lama and second most important
figure in Tibetan Buddhism. He was six years old in
1995 when Chinese authorities seized him and his
family. Chadrel Rinpoche, who had been involved in the
identification and selection of the Panchen Lama, was
released from prison, but was reported to be under
house arrest. Nyima (Kelsang Yeshe), Panam (Pema
Namgyal), and Thubten, three aides to the
eighteen-year old Karmapa, another high ranking
religious figure, were detained for aiding his escape
to India in 1999. In April, authorities seized Tenzin
Delek Rinpoche, an influential religious teacher, and
several of his staff. Officials in Sichuan province
continued to demolish huts and evict residences from
Serthar Buddhist Institute (Larung Gar), a monastic
encampment housing thousands of Buddhist students.
At a meeting in July of the heads of individual
monasteries' Democratic Management Committees, the
leader of the Regional Group for Monastery and
Religious Affairs, a local government body created by
the Chinese, reportedly said that monks and nuns
should "boldly" expose the Dalai Lama and enhance
their patriotic awareness. In August, police detained
five monks from Drepung monastery for listening to
pro-independence songs and for attempting to raise the
banned Tibetan flag. That same month, officials and
neighborhood committee leaders told Tibetan government
workers in Lhasa that they were in danger of losing
their pensions and even their jobs if they traveled to
Mount Kalish, a sacred site in western Tibet.
In July, authorities closed Tsang-Sul, a privately run
school in Lhasa dedicated to preserving the Tibetan
language.
Xinjiang
Throughout 2002, China's leaders reiterated their
claims that Uighurs supporting an independent East
Turkestan were ipso facto terrorists aligned with an
international terrorist movement. On January 21, the
State Council offered extensive "evidence" of Muslim
group terrorist activities. In May, regional Party
committee chairman Wang Lequan announced that one
thousand Uighurs had fought with the Taliban. The U.S.
designation of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
as a terrorist organization and subsequent U.N.
Security Council formal classification of the group as
such appeared to lend credence to China's claims.
Human Rights Watch had no independent information on
ETIM or its activities. Allegations that the group
advocated violent struggle against the Chinese, if
true, would distinguish it from most Uighur groups,
which did not advocate violence.
Steps to curtail "ethnic splittists, religious
extremists, and violent terrorists" in Xinjiang
included death sentences and extremely long prison
terms. According to reports, authorities executed two
people and sentenced twenty-six others in Aksu in
November 2001 for "separatist" activities; arrested
another nine people in December in the Byingolin
Mongol prefecture for preaching illegally and
translating the Koran into local languages; arrested
scores of people in March in Kasghar for separatism
and illegal religious activities; and in April in
Hotan, sentenced several more alleged separatists to
seven- to twenty-year terms.
The clampdown also featured curbs on Uighur language,
culture, and religious practice. In January, after a
jobless worker read a poem in the Xinjiang People's
Hall in Urumqi that allegedly obliquely advocated a
separate Uighur state, government chairman Abulahat
Abdurixit announced a purge of those who "openly
advocate separatism using the name of art." In
September, the Xinjiang Cultural Bureau and Xinjiang
Dance Troupe fired workers in charge of the program. A
disciplinary circular called the incident a "serious
political event" from which officials must learn a "deep
lesson."
In January, in what was billed as an attempt to
prevent hostile foreign forces from influencing
opinion in the region, authorities in Yili prefecture
cracked down on illegal TV stations. They ordered
increased surveillance of Muslim weddings, funerals,
circumcisions, and house moving rituals. In March,
authorities closed fifty-two of 118 state-controlled
publications, citing "poor quality," but there was
serious concern that those closed represented
dissenting political viewpoints. Reports surfaced in
June of book burnings and tight censorship by the
government-owned Kashgar Uighur Publishing House.
Titles destroyed included, A Brief History of the Huns,
Ancient Uighur Literature, and Ancient Uighur
Craftsmanship.
Ideological campaigns for educators and religious
leaders continued. In mandatory "anti-separation
struggle reeducation classes," work teams admonished
teachers, particularly those in secondary schools, to
pay more attention to politics. In May, Xinjiang
University encouraged using Chinese in courses
previously taught in Uighur or Kazakh. Mandatory
classes for the region's imams focused on political
indoctrination. Some two thousand were trained in
2002. To complement the classes, authorities assigned
ethnic cadres to specific mosques to engage in
dialogue with imams.
In late 2001, the U.N. Human Rights Committee ruled
that Uighur scholar Tohti Tunyaz had been arbitrarily
detained. He was sentenced in March 1999 to an
eleven-year term for "inciting separatism" and "illegally
acquiring state secrets" after he returned to Xinjiang
in connection with his research studies on ethnic
minorities at the University of Tokyo. In another
prominent case, prison authorities in Xinjiang
continued to limit family visits to Rebiya Kadeer to
once every three months, breaching Chinese regulations
that allow monthly prison visits. An Uighur
businesswoman, Kadeer had received an eight-year
prison term in March 2000 for sending newspapers to
her husband in the U.S.
Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, government plans to introduce
anti-subversion legislation overshadowed other human
rights issues. On September 24, Hong Kong's Security
Bureau released a consultation document, "Proposals to
Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law," outlining new
laws on sedition, subversion, treason, and secession.
The document incorporated a three-month window for
public comment. Critics questioned the Hong Kong
government's prior consultations with Beijing on the
proposed legislation, pointing to the provision in
article 23 of the Basic Law (the territory's
mini-constitution) that Hong Kong was to enact such
legislation "on its own." They took issue with
inclusion of subversion and secession, arguing that
existing laws on treason and sedition encompassed the
two; and they expressed concern that the document did
not include the proposed wording of the new laws, but
used vague language that, if included in the final
draft, could become severely restrictive of basic
rights. With Chinese courts in all probability having
final jurisdiction in cases involving subversion,
opponents feared all political dissent would be
quashed. Specific concerns included: proposed police
powers to search offices and homes without warrants in
cases of suspected crimes of subversion; outlawing of
groups affiliated with organizations which Beijing had
banned on national security grounds; the prohibition
on giving support to organizations that Beijing had
labeled state security risks; a new offense called
intimidation of the PRC government; and broad language
on theft of state secrets. Journalists expressed
concern that dissent could be interpreted as sedition,
and that routine reporting on Hong Kong mainland
relations could be interpreted as a breach of the
proposed state secrets provisions.
Hong Kong authorities in 2002 also made it more
difficult for opposition groups to obtain permits for
marches, demonstrations, and rallies. In the first
such case since the 1997 handover, two activists were
charged with unauthorized public assembly for
organizing a rally. From April through September,
police banned protests on public order grounds, moved
other rallies to locales where demonstrators would be
out of sight of the protests' targets, and on at least
one occasion seized protestors' bullhorns, arguing
their use was disruptive.
DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Independent human rights monitoring organizations did
not exist in China in 2002. Unregistered social
organizations continued to be illegal by definition,
and the Civil Affairs Bureau (CAB), responsible for
registering organizations, continued to have the power
to deny legal status to groups not meeting conditions
set forth in "Social Organization Registration and
Management Regulations." Such conditions included
alleged opposition to constitutional principles,
damage to national unity or the state's interests, and
lack of a government sponsor. Hong Kong had a large
and active nongovernmental organization (NGO)
community, subject to little government interference.
There were reports of intrusive inquiries into
organizations with agendas the government disliked,
but the affected groups continued to function largely
unimpeded.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
In 2002, China's diplomacy succeeded in deflecting
human rights criticism, preventing attempts to censure
China's record at the U.N., and using the global
anti-terrorist agenda to justify its crackdown at home.
As a new member of the World Trade Organization with
an attractive commercial market, China was able to
ignore international concerns about labor unrest and
worker rights violations without significant
repercussions. Although Internet censorship created
problems for some major U.S.-based Internet companies,
the business community failed to mount an effective
counter-strategy. China's political use of psychiatric
detention received unprecedented international
attention, but it was unclear whether the World
Psychiatric Association (WPA) would hold Beijing
accountable to its commitment to allow an independent
WPA delegation visit to China.
United Nations
For only the second time since 1990, no country
sponsored a resolution condemning China's human rights
record at the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights meeting (March 18-April 26). The U.S. lost its
seat on the commission in 2002 and no European nation
was willing to place China on the commission's agenda.
In August, then U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights Mary Robinson opened a U.N. workshop on
judicial independence in Beijing at which she observed
that Chinese law and practice still falls short of
international human rights standards. In meetings with
Vice-Premier Qian Qichen and other officials, Robinson
raised a number of individual cases, including Xu
Wenli, Rebiya Kadeer, and those of labor leaders in
China's northeast. She noted that the treatment of
Tibetans and Uighur Muslims was of particular concern
and that China had used anti-terrorism laws to
crackdown on these groups.
In October, Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized
the need for "complete mobilization of society" to
combat an escalating AIDS epidemic in China.
Chinese authorities continued to work with several U.N.
agencies, among them the U.N. Development Programme
(UNDP), the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the U.N.
Education, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Programs included AIDS prevention, poverty reduction,
health and hygiene improvement, and rural education
for girls.
China made no progress toward ratifying the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which it signed in October 1998.
In June, the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) asked the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of
Association to take up the cases of the labor
activists detained in the northeast. Although the ILO
is already involved in several technical assistance
programs in China, including development of a social
security project, China still has not responded to a
June 2000 ILO request to send a direct contact mission
to discuss freedom of association
European Union
The E.U. continued to stress engagement and dialogue,
but refrained from overt pressure on Chinese officials
to improve human rights.
In March, the European Commission approved a strategy
document setting out a framework for E.U.-China
cooperation over the next five years. Although it
focused on economic reform, the E.U. expressed concern
over restrictions on civil and political rights in
China and the rights of ethnic minorities.
On March 5 and 6, the Spanish Presidency hosted an
E.U.-China human rights dialogue in Madrid. The
General Affairs Council (E.U. foreign ministers) later
made several recommendations to China for improvement
of human rights, including ratifying the ICCPR;
limiting the use of the death penalty while moving
toward its total elimination; working more closely
with U.N. human rights mechanisms; respecting the
rights of prisoners and ending torture; respecting
freedom of expression, religion, and association; and
respecting cultural rights and religious freedom in
Tibet and Xinjiang.
E.U. External Affairs Minister Chris Patten visited
China in late March. He met with President Jiang
Zemin, and noted the E.U.'s concern about China's
human rights practices, particularly its treatment of
Tibet and the use of the death penalty.
A China-E.U. summit, hosted by the Danish Presidency
and attended by Premier Zhu Rongji, took place in
Copenhagen on September 24, at the time of the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Despite the two sides'
agreement to "continue their human rights dialogue on
the basis of equality and mutual respect," the meeting
was disappointing, laying out no concrete measures for
improvement in China's human rights situation. The E.U.
and China continued their human rights dialogue in
Copenhagen in November.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Counter-terrorism was high on the agenda of the
January Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
meeting. The five Central Asian members and China
agreed to step up campaigns against militant Muslim
groups and "extremists" and to form a regional
counter-terrorism agency.
The Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., in response
to a Human Rights Watch letter to all SCO governments
urging inclusion of human rights issues on the
anti-terrorism agenda, said that China's preservation
of "national sovereignty and territorial integrity"
protected the human rights of its population from
terrorists. It also forwarded detailed accusations
against Uighur groups allegedly involved in terrorist
activities.
India and Japan
In January, Premier Zhu Rongji made China's first
state visit to India in over a decade. Human rights
were not on the agenda of Zhu's New Delhi meeting with
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The two
pledged cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts and
Zhu urged India to resume dialogue with Pakistan.
During a visit to Beijing by Japanese Foreign Minister
Yoriko Kawaguchi in September, Chinese officials
agreed to schedule a bilateral human rights dialogue
meeting before the end of the year. The last such
meeting had taken place in October 2000. Japan hoped
to raise the dialogue talks to a higher level in the
foreign ministry. During Kawaguchi's visit, Japanese
officials announced a likely reduction in Japan's
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China, a
follow up to last year's 25 percent cut. Japanese
public and political opinion is strongly opposed to
large scale ODA to China in light of Beijing's
military build-up and its continued economic growth.
Yen loans to China in fiscal year 2001, ending March
31, 2002, totaled U.S.$1.3 billion.
Australia and Canada
During his March visit to Australia, Chinese Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan urged Australia to crack down on
Falungong followers and to refuse to meet the Dalai
Lama during his upcoming May visit. Prime Minister
John Howard and Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander
Downer did refuse to see the exiled Tibetan leader,
but other senior Foreign Affairs Ministry officials
met with him. Downer declared his meeting with Tang to
be productive. Dialogue ranged from consular issues to
human rights.
Howard toured China only days after the Dalai Lama's
visit. Meetings with President Jiang Zemin and other
officials focused on business.
In mid-June, Canberra hosted Tibet's Communist Party
Secretary, Guo Jinlong, on a one-week unofficial tour.
Downer raised human rights concerns, in particular
Tibetan cultural identity and freedom of religion. He
also noted Australia's desire to extend its human
rights technical assistance program in China to Tibet.
Canada expected to continue its bilateral human rights
dialogue at a November meeting in Beijing.
United States
Human rights and religious freedom remained on the
U.S. agenda, but terrorism and China's cooperation on
strategic issues became the major issues.
Seeking to further stabilize political and economic
relations, President George W. Bush made his first
official visit to Beijing in February. Bush focused
heavily on religious freedom in his private talks with
Jiang Zemin, and later called on China to embrace
democracy and religious freedom in a speech at Qinghua
University. Bush said nothing publicly about China's
attempt to justify its crackdown in Xinjiang on
anti-terrorism grounds although when the two leaders
met again in late October in Crawford, Texas, he did
comment on repression of ethnic minorities.
Jiang's successor, Vice-President Hu Jintao, visited
the U.S. in early May. In his meeting with Hu, Bush
reiterated his concern for religious freedom. There
was lengthy discussion about Tibet, with Hu
reiterating the party line. The two agreed on trade
and terrorism. Hu snubbed congressional leaders by
refusing to accept four letters appealing for the
release of political prisoners and for progress on
human rights. Secretary of State Colin Powell also
raised human rights and Tibet in a working session
with Hu.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
in its annual report in May issued a scathing
assessment of the current state of religious freedom
in China, which later denied access to a commission
delegation. The newly appointed Ambassador-at-Large
for International Religious Freedom John Hanford
visited China in early August and met with government
and officially sanctioned religious groups.
In August, during Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage's trip to Beijing, the State Department added
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to its list of
terrorist organizations. The move was a major coup for
China, expected to use the designation to justify its
broad repression of ethnic Uighurs. Armitage urged
China to "respect minority rights, particularly the
Uighurs" and raised the cases of individual political
prisoners.
At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
annual meeting in July in Brunei, the State Department
resisted pressure from Chinese Foreign Minister Tang
to resume the bilateral human rights dialogue until it
saw tangible progress resulting from the October 2001
session in Washington, D.C. Although China's response
was minimal--a few prisoner releases and the Tibetan
envoys' visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region--just
days before the Bush-Jiang summit, the U.S. State
Deptartment announced that a dialogue meeting would be
resumed the week of December 16 in Beijing.
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC),
established in 2000 to monitor human rights conditions
in China and to make policy recommendations, issued
its first report in early October. It analyzed human
rights trends and made generally weak recommendations.
The commission held two hearings and several staff
briefings during the year, but sent no congressional
delegation to China.
World Bank
Of the nearly U.S.$563 million the World Bank lent to
China in fiscal year 2002 ending in June, $300 million
went to tuberculosis control, sustainable forestry
development, and highway projects in western regions.
The bank co-sponsored an anti-corruption conference in
Beijing in mid-April. In May, bank president James
Wolfensohn visited China. He urged China to improve
corporate governance, and in meetings with President
Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and the National
People's Congress, he confirmed the bank's commitment
to help alleviate poverty in the western regions.
Wolfensohn met with various civil society
representatives, but did not initiate any new legal or
judicial reform efforts or raise concerns about
Chinese Internet restrictions.
In November, the bank and the Chinese Ministry of
Civil Affairs co-sponsored an international seminar on
nongovernmental organization (NGO) development and
regulation in Shanghai. Human Rights Watch asked the
bank to privately intervene with Chinese authorities
on the detention of the HIV/AIDS activist Dr. Wan
Yanhai, but the bank declined.
© Copyright 2002, Human Rights Watch
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